santapelota

Dunga to make a return to the bench?

2011-03-02T09:32:00.009-03:00

During the 2010 World Cup, I was among several voices to suggest that, whether Brazil went on to glory or fall at an earlier hurdle, and regardless of aesthetic considerations, this was a team that played with the cohesiveness of club side. More to the point, I reckoned that Dunga appeared every inch a club coach, having managed to instill a mechanical quality in his team's play.

Granted, international football provides less of an opportunity for coaches to impose their model on a squad than is true of their club counterparts. There are, though, some managers who seem to imbue any side with a system that is distinctively their own; whoever hires Arrigo Sacchi, Marcelo Bielsa or Alberto Zaccheroni for instance surely knows that these are not the most holisitic nor improvisational of coaches and that their unyielding methods seem to accompany them wholesale. You want this coach, you sign on for the whole package. So perhaps such coaches, assuming the playing staff are compatible, are suited to making the switch between club and country.

Dunga, when we consider his lack of experience, might seem an odd addition to that crew. But what if he were to take the jump the other way around? Yes, club management is a different kind of gig, surely there is no greater baptism of fire for a rookie than the pressure of negotiating Brazil through an international tournament.

Following his exit from the national team, there was serious talk of Dunga being replaced by current Internazionale boss Leonardo. The speculation was rendered credible by recalling how Leonardo had merely been through a stint as youth team coach before making the jump from various directorial functions to senior team coach within the AC Milan empire. Either way, that still amounted to some serious fast-tracking.

In Dunga's case, there were rumours last year that he might take the managerial reins at his old club Fiorentina, and this time round he is being linked to another team close, perhaps closest, to his heart, Internacional of Porto Alegre.

Overall, the southern Brazilian club has been a success story in recent years, collecting two Libertadores, beating Barcelona to collect the World Club Cup gong and narrowly missing out on the domestic league title in the midst of dubious refereeing in favour of eventual winners Corinthians (according to post-facto comments by Corinthians' own president at that time). The Colorado, along with São Paulo, have perhaps more than any Brazilian club been a model of institutional stability, organisation and youth player production, Alexandre Pato, Sandro and Giuliano being notable examples.

Inter also formed a young Carlos Bledhorn Verri (Dunga's real name) since adolescence, though in truth it was as much Dunga himself who did the forging, by force of his sheer resolve. In a manner which would echo Scott Parker's career at Charlton Athletic, Dunga initially struggled to make an impression as a striker, all bustle and no finesse, only for him to refashion himself as an enforcing midfielder. His European career spells would take him to Pisa, Fiorentina and Stuttgart and would propel him towards his crowning achievement, vindication even, when he lifted the World Cup in 1994.

An admirer of Dunga's Brazil, Michael Cox of zonalmarking.net dissected the system that the disciplinarian coach implanted upon the side between the aftermath of the 2007 Copa America success and the impressive World Cup qualification campaign in South America. It was a pity, others suggested that Spain and Brazil did not cross paths during the finals and we were left with a sense of what could have been one of the great tactical match-ups in history: the world's best possession-based side versus the best counter-attacking side. As Tim Vickery remarked, Brazil were potentially more lethal when defending a corner than were opponents who were taking it.

If only in terms of its assymetry, that Brazil side bore a resembleance to the 4-2-2-2 of the 1982 side whom Dunga held in scant regard. Of course, Telê Santana's central midfield pairing of Toninho Cerezo and Falcão couldn't be further removed from the destructive stylings of the Gilberto Silva - Felipe Melo double act. As with Éder almost three decades ago, Robinho played as a winger-cum-support striker on the left. But for the wide-of-centre role along the other flank, Dunga's preference for the application of an-round player such as Elano contrasted with Santana's use of the artistic Zico playing higher and with licence to drift inside and combine with Socrates, the side's other advanced playmaker. In this later respect, the trequartistas were also representative of the broader difference in style between the sides; whereas Sócrates was languid and imaginative, Kaká was percussive and objective.

How is all this relevant to S.C. Internacional?

Current coach Celso Roth is grudgingly respected but not universally liked amongst the fans, who look at his CV and see a litany of 'nearly-man' moments. As the Brazilian phrase goes, he is the eternal "Paraguayan horse", meaning that he starts campaigns spectacularly well only to fall at the later stages whether on account of insufficient tactical nous or poor psychological masterand just when the going gets tough. It is true that Roth steered Inter to the Libertadores title in 2010, but this was after being hired ad hoc following the sacking of Jorge Fossatti and with the team already at the quarter-final stage. More specifically, the sceptics reckon that even though Roth is adept at organising teams, his vision of the game is too reactive and also derivative.

His predecessor Fossatti had struggled to mould Inter in a 3-4-2-1 shape and with a counter-attacking style, this in a team overflowing with creative midfielders and wanting in quality wing-backs. Domestic results were dissapointing but Fossatti did have the good sense to introduce a 4-2-3-1 arrangement towards the end of his reign which better distributed the players over the pitch and lent the defence more protection whilst thrusting young speedster Taison into a wide-attacking role. Upon commandeering proceedings, Roth did well not to shake things up and so a counter-attacking style took hold - not that a 4-2-3-1 is necessarily conducive to counter-attacking, but rather the ultra-defensive posture of central midfield duo Guiñazu and Sandro ensured that most of Inter's elaborate play restricted itself to in and around the final third.

Since the summit of glory reached in August, things have not gone so smoothly for Inter and Roth. To be fair, such is the precarity of player contracts with Brazilian clubs and so alluring is the interest of European club suitors, standout talents in these competitions tend to be sold on immediately by their clubs who calculate that these players have reached their peak of their South America-based cycle in terms of media projection and so it is better to cash in. Tottenham Hotspur had already signed Sandro months before his bow-out in the Libertadores final, for example, and Inter had to plead with the North London club to be allowed to continue availing of the defensive midfielder right up until he would join Spurs' opening league campaign. This just goes to show the logistical as well as business minefield that Brazilian clubs have to negotiate in terms of maximising yield from their player assetts. With a Libertadores Cup on his CV, Sandro could have been hawked to a higher bidder, but Spurs had offered the cash before Libertadores success had even looked like a remote possibility.

In the wake of the South Africa World Cup, Brazil's sports media was filled with talk of the 4-2-3-1 which, despite its obsequiance across Europe this past decade, is a relative novelty in South America. Inevitably, Roth was accussed of adopting this formation as one might any mere fad and just when it was enjoying popularity. Which is a bit unfair. Would Roth or any Brazilian coach for that matter be unjustified in looking far afield for tactical inspiration? The same critics who denounced this supposed display of fickleness often were the same who simultaneously accused him of stubborness and of being wedded to antiquated tactics such as 3-5-2 or his occassional use of three defensive midfielders. Roth could never please everybody even if he tried.

With this in mind, Inter has begun to rebuild so as to best emulate the team in place during the first half of 2010. However, such rebuilding need not be anywhere near as thorough as that which the likes of Flamengo or Fluminense, other clubs to have enjoyed recent success followed by transfer market depredation, have had to undergo. A replacement was and still is needed for Taison to open up the attack. Zé Roberto was brought in from Vasco da Gama but, bizarrely, Roth has insisted on fielding an advanced midfield trio without the only player comfortable attacking from wide areas.

It goes without saying that 4-2-3-1 is not some kind of monolith and that players of varying styles can be accomodated by it. Even so, if the formation was indeed developed in Spain with the intention of facilitating as many ball-playing specialists as possible, then some of Celso Roth's colourings of the format seem disconcerting. For example, Gattuso-esque midfielders such as Guiñazu and Tinga have often featured in the three-quarters role. Rafael Sóbis, whilst hardly an immobile target man in the Serginho Chulapa mould, clearly struggles to reproduce his best form playing so wide and relatively deep. Then there is the impact of Giuliano's departure for FC Dnipro which, though good business for Inter in terms of cash stumped up by the Ukrainians, served to highlight how little Roth trusted the young playmaker who was ideally suited to any of the advanced midfield positions in the system. Inter now have a similarly-hewn tyro to follow in Guiliano's footsteps. Oscar, who featured in the successful South American U-20s tournament, should be accomodated so as not to leave Argentine enganche Andrés D'Alessandro exclusively burdened with dictating the play, but if Roth was loathe to use Giuliano - what chances him calling upon an even younger talent?

The suspicion prevails that Roth is trying to squeeze players into an immutable system of play when he would do as well to institute a new structure to suit the characteristics of the players at his disposal. For example, the classic Brazilian 4-2-2-2 or even a diamond midfield would make sense in that at Inter have more than two defensive midfielders, two playmakers and three strikers in the senior squad who would be considered part of the 'starting fourteen', if we are to go by the law of 11 + 3 super substitutes. For the sake of dressing-room contentment, it may be necessary to introduce a two-striker system.

If indeed Dunga does land the managerial hotseat at the Beira Rio stadium, it will be fascinating to see whether he takes such a measured approach or whether, convinced of the merits of his system with the seleção, he will try to implement that assymetric formation which was variably4-3-2-1, 4-2-3-1, 4-3-1-2 or 4-2-2-2 depending on who you talked to. What was discernable to all eyes, though, was the torted shape and the diagonal running from the outside-left (Robinho) to the right-of-centre midfielder (Elano, sometimes Dani Alves or Ramires). Each one of the latter three brought his own qualitites to bear on a berth that required diligence and dynamism. Were he to reconstitute this with the current Inter squad, Dunga would find Guiñazu and Tinga can offer the hard running of a Ramires, though no obvious candidate to replicate Elano's quintessentially balanced game. Perhaps Oscar can be remoulded to become something of a box-to-box player (albeit one with finesse), something of a big ask within the context of Brazilian playmakers and the almost Argentine-like reverance they are afforded. In any case, it would surely serve Oscar in a future move to Europe since even playmakers there are expected to contribute defensively.

For the wide-attacking role, Sóbis, though nowhere near as fast as Taison and certainly not anywhere near as tricky as Robinho, could do a job cutting onto his preferred right-foot. The Luis Fabiano-role would be contested by the rangy, aggressive youngster Leandro Damião and new signing, Argentine number nine Fernando Cavenaghi, but it is hard to see Alecsandro, with his lack of composure in the penalty and his earned distrust from the Inter faithful, clambering back up the pecking order to be the targetman. Pedigree would give Cavenaghi the nod but the 3-player limit on non-naturalised foreigners may provide more starting opportunities for Leandro Damião.

Early days yet, but the best addition so far to the Colorado has been Argentine defensive midfielder Mario Bolatti. The player won himself a transfer to Fiorentina in early 2010 on the back of steady performaces for Angel Cappa's Huracán plus, of course, that dramatic goal which clinched World Cup qualification for Argentina in Montevideo. At six foot three inches, Bolatti becomes an valuable bulwark against high balls aimed between Inter's ageing centre-backs, something which Sandro used to provide. The last thing anybody was expecting however, least of all the player himself was that he would notch up three goals in his opening two games for Inter (from a career-total of nine, to date) but apart from understandably ingratiating himself with the supporters, such a feat now provides Inter with an added threat from set-pieces. Dunga, let it be said, placed a premium on well-rehearsed set-pieces as a part of Brazil's offensive armoury.

Taken within the wider context of Brazilian football, and despite the ignimony over Brazil's World Cup exit and Dunga's hostile demeanour throughout the tournament, it is hard to conceive of the 1994 Cup-winning captain being treated with ridicule or even scepticism should indeed he chose to enter club management in Porto Alegre. Unprofessional outbursts aside, no one could accuse Dunga of being managment putty in the meddlesome hands of the Brazilian Football Confederation and its notoriously politicking patriarch, Ricardo Texeira. On the contrary, the former Inter player demonstrated an uncompromising integrity against special interests in stark contrast with some of the shady dealings that have pervaded the gravy train that is and was the Brazilian national team in recent years. If such an experience has not gelded him for the intrigues and pressure of a club coaching job, then he surely will lose no time in trying to impose his will.

As for the implications of what style of football Dunga represents and how his teams, nay before kicking a ball, would be perceived, it is hard to say. It is true he is a poster boy, a convenient one at that, for the kind of dogged, more athletic football that seemed to take hold in Brazil since the dawn of the nineties. But it is not as if Brazilian coaches nationwide have needed any encouragement in following suit as Brazilian midfields became beefed-up, nor have many had the means or disposition to fight a rearguard ideological reaction in homage to the sides of 1982 and 1970.

Arguably the most entertaining club side of recent years, the Santos of Neymar and Ganso would be immensely popular champions were they to sweep to the league title with their customary panache, and deservedly so. But the fact remains that the most successful Brazilian sides of recent years, in terms of silverware have been defensively-minded, and in the cases of São Paulo and Fluminense, even cagey.

A Dunga-led side would not be melifluous entertainers but they almost certainly would be effective, better at doing what most Brazilian sides end up resorting to anyway.

Two cents on England's midfield versus Denmark

2011-02-10T11:33:00.006-02:00

Here is a maelstrom of thoughts on the tactical component of England's midfield set-up versus Denmark in Copenhagen.

Leading up to the game there was much discussion surrounding 19-year old Jack Wilshere and specifically Fabio Capello's pronouncements on the Arsenal man playing a deep-lying role. Perhaps the waters were muddied by Capello's allusions to Claude Makélélé and his eponymous role. The Guardian's Paul Hawyard, for instance, prompted an intriguing debate by questioning whether a holding role would "shackle" Wilshere

Amidst all this, I thought it might be timely to delve into some of the points raised in that ensuing debate and try to seperate hot air, as I see it, from substance.

The notion of a player having "natural position" or being "played out of position" is constantly levelled at coaches who make anything from radical alterations to slight adjustments. Such a view can also be needlessly restrictive, after all, many players can perform in more than one recogniseable position without significantly altering their role or much less subverting their innate qualities.

For instance, is Lionel Messi necessarily shackled when varyingly being started at outside-right in one game and false centre-forward in the next? Is there a noticeable rise or dip in his performance? Does his natural game suffer?

This, I must qualify, is not to be equated with those reliably versatile players, those jacks of all trades who often appear to exude seven-out-of-ten in every category yet nine-out-of-ten in no particular one (which still, let it be said, amounts to what are demonstrably good players).

So often do we overlook that positions and roles are not fixed, sovereign coordinates but rather colourings detectable on a vast spectrum, one position invariably bleeding into another. In the above example of Messi, the player will obviously benefit from a certain degree of freedom to displace himself to those areas and towards those players with whom he feels most comfortable. The day some benighted tactician plays Messi as a central midfielder or at left-wing back, these logical leaps will doubtless induce us to decry such abuse of a player's faculties.

Even the most fervent tactical chartspotter will suffer fatigue when attempting to pinpoint a player's fixed position along the spectrum; akin to attempting to define a precise shade of blue. Yet in the face of such an engulfing reality, reactions range from weary to forensic. The late Gianni Brera for instance bequeathed the Italian language an impressive lexicon of tactical terms and definitions for various positions in football. This legacy was not confined to a sports-media chateratti but permeated down to the popular classes and their vernacular. Which may explain why Capello with his holding forth on "the Makelele role" probably thought he was merely using verbal shorthand or engaging in casual bar-talk, not exhaustive nit-picking.

One theme which cropped up in discussion of Wilshere's role was the promotion of 'versatility'.

Towards that strand of footballers who are praised for their consistently even performances across a variety of positions, we are usually more accepting of their temporary displacement and even the resultant discretion of their performances. It is as if their natural game didn't seem eye-catching enough to warrant attention in the first place or to be missed thereafter. They are "doing a job", as the parlance goes. Maybe they could be doing a better job elsewhere but this doesn't nag at our conscience nor is our sense of there being some harmony in the footballing cosmos disturbed.

Nonetheless, let's examine this custom in its other manifestations; what if the fruits of this job-doing are the shackling of a player whose plenitude is blatantly being curtailed ? His versatility becomes a personal degradation and a collective atrophy since the benefits of his natural 'specialised' game we can't bear to go without.

Bringing this back to England and Wilshere inio the context of that Denmark game, it is difficult to discern what Wilshere's role was or, for that matter, what it was intended to be. Was he simply to share duties with Frank Lampard, as one of two indistinguishable parts? Would this be tantamount to overlooking their quite different qualities?

The Chelsea man's movement is locomotive and his instinct objective, whereas the Arsenal tyro is more elusive and imaginative respectively. Lampard is associated with conclusion where Wilshere's game is more conducive to progression. And if they were intended to be a central duo, what office were they entrusted to share, caution or enterprise? The emphasis could have been towards sitting-back but equally getting forward as often as possible might have been the priority. We are told by those advocates of yoking box-to-box midfielders in pairs that the players themselves will sort it out and come to an understanding. Yet there might be recrimination if the sum of the two players is a pale diminishment of their seperate contributions from when they were both individual parts.

Furthermore, Arsène Wenger's assertion that he sees Wilshere as "more of a box-to-box player" is probably attested to by heat maps, but surely it also ought to be qualified by the admission that he is very much a box-to-box playmaker, whereas Lampard (closer to the steamrolling Bryan Robson archetype) is patently not.

Once again, the contentious question of what constitutes a holding midfielder rears its head. To some, the omnipresence of this term in football-related conversation is an irritant. I can't help but think that here language and culture come into play. For many pundits in the Anglophone world, the term has become synonymous with "destruction" and "defensiveness". But is this necessarily the case?

Not so with Spanish for example, where the term mediocentro - literally, 'centre-half' -is the stock phrase that survives into the present day and describes all kinds of central and holding midfielder to the point where there is no distinction between the two. A central midfielder is a player who holds. The degree to which a holding midfielder's particular qualities render his role more or less destructive/creative is as varied as the gamut of players themselves to whom the term is typically applied: Xabi Alonso, Nigel de Jong, Andrea Pirlo and Gilberto Silva are but some of the players usually denominated "mediocentros". This habit is indicative of a common denominator: these players try to stay behind the line of play relative to the ball either as an obstacle or as a reference (a rallying point from where attacks can be recycled again). Ironically, this is a maxim that has been articulated by John Giles, someone who is openly scathing of what he considers to be a senseless veneration of the holding midfielder (though it is not unreasonable to presume that Giles' wrath has been stoked by the preponderance of those holding players who are overtly defensive and lack creative faculties).

It could well be that Fabio Capello envisages Wilshere as a holding midfielder, but certainly the mere presence of another player (any player) accompanying him will entail some licence for Wilshere to venture forward. This is by no means an uncommon arrangement elsewhere. In the classic Spanish double-pivot typified by Valencia between 2000 and 2004, David Albelda was an overtly defensive component whilst Rubén Baraja, though dutifully exercising positional caution, was more of a box-to-box all-rounder. More recently, and perhaps more comparable to England and Wilshere in terms of creativity, is the example of Villarreal and Borja Valero who was redeployed from a more advanced position to partner Bruno Soriano in central midfield, with Bruno clearly more inclined to screen the defence. We could even go back to Cesc Fàbregas' early career at Arsenal when he was occassionally paired with Gilberto Silva or later Mathieu Flamini. Then again, all this could prove to be conjecture were it to emerge that Capello is anticipating a lone holding role for Wilshere in the Pirlo fashion. It would follow that Wilshere would then be England's deepest-lying midfielder, but the knock-on effects are such that Capello would have to consider placing two enforcers in the mould of Gattuso and Ambrosini ahead of the young creator, as did Ancelotti with Pirlo.

One certainty that did transpire in the Copenhagen friendly, was that whatever the doubts surrounding Lampard, Wilshere's deployment in a relatively deep role did bring clarity and fluidity to an area in which England have been orphaned for what must seem like forever. How refreshing it was to see an England goalkeeper and his centre-backs offered a reliable option for the releasing of a first ball out of defence and which wasn't the full-backs spreading to receive, all the while knowing that Wilshere not only served as an outlet to relieve pressure from the press of opposing forwards, but could also subsequently distribute the ball in a manner that was neither overambitious nor bureaucratic.

As regards Lampard and Wilshere in a central pairing, the suspicion abounds that as holding players go they are perfunctory exponents and that both need the company of a specialist to liberate them. But is either man happy to be that safety net to the other for certain passages of play?

Michael Cox of Zonalmarking.net observes that Germany's Basti Schweinsteiger and Sami Khedira formed a well-rounded partnership at the 2010 World Cup that somewhat surprised people given Schweinsteiger's more wide-midfield attacking origins. Even more interesting was Schweinsteiger's willingness to sit in midfield and Khedira'a occassional attacking incursions. However, a moot point is whether Germany's midfield stability and fluidity would be adversely alterted were the attacking liberties in the equation to fall 70:30 in Khedira's favour. Paradoxically, Khedira's incorporations into the attack are so dangerous precisely because of their comparative rarity when held against those of Schweinsteiger, in that they are less predictable. With Lampard and Wilshere however, neither is as naturally inclined to screen a defence as is Khedira, which leads me to the following conclusion.

Frank Lampard and Jack Wilshere can reign in their dissimilar progressive instincts to play as auxiliary holding midfielders - but not to one another. There is a case to be made for the inclusion of a dedicated holding player of any variety (destructive or creative as the circumstances of each game dicate) - a trio then being formed, enabling both Lampard and Wilshere to more fully exude their respective games without concern for adulteration.

This does raise the question of where Gerrard (among others) would then play - but we've been down this weary road before.

Inter vs Inter: Club World Cup preview

2010-12-08T15:53:00.005-02:00

No, this is not some concocted spin on in-fighting among the nerazzuri.

Internazionale's problems have been well documented of late, the only contention being whether this is due to Rafael Benitez's tactical obduracy and fitness regime, sheer bad luck with injuries or a perfect storm of all of the above.

But what about their Brazilian namesake, SC Internacional of Porto Alegre?

It's no secret that for any South American club side, the intercontinental gong is seen as the pinnacle of club competition, an attitude completely at odds with the esteem in which European supporters hold it - some more than others, it must be said.

For Inter (the Reds, as opposed to the Black-and-Blues), there is an element of viewing this clash in Manichean terms; the chance to show the rest of the world that no matter how they whisk away the best Brazilian talent at a young age to the higher pay and esteem of European leagues, they cannot ignore or disrespect the South Americans' credentials. Of course, whatever ignorance exists on may be borne out by the reality that winning a one-off match against a European champion (featuring at least three star Brazilian players) is hardly testament to definitive superiority.

We take it as a given that such intercontinental ties should be dismissed by fans of English teams, what, given the cultural isolation between Northern Europe and South America that exits (sometimes self-imposed in the case of England and international tournaments). But besides the innate intertwining of history that exists between Spain and Portugal and their former colonies, there are also strong demographic links with Italy.

Mass immigration during the past century-and-half dictated that over half of today's populations of Uruguay and Argentina is of Italian descent, and large swathes of southern Brazil whence S.C. Internacional draw their support, can boast a similar profile. This has a natural effect of a) better enabling certain players to claim Italian, Spanish or Portuguese citizenship and thereby become eligible to play as EU-community players and b) promoting a level of awareness of southern European club sides among the Argentine, Uruguayan and Brazilian public. In the case of Brazil, we have big club sides such as Palmeiras and Cruzeiro who were previously called Palestra Italia or indeed smaller sides such as Juventus from São Paulo, founded by Italian immigrants.

In terms of how this affects the World Club Cup, it is certain that claiming the reigning Italian and European champion's scalp would be seventh heaven for the legion of Internacional supporters. For the Milanese outfit, on the other hand, perhaps fans would not exactly cry tears of dispair or joy, but there is at least some pride at stake here and not just in terms of equaling their rossoneri city neighours who won the prize in recent history. The Argentine and Brazilian playing staff at Inter will lend this clash a touch of particular interest and it is hard to imagine Esteban Cambiasso or Lucio taking this adventure lightly.

Admittedly, and from Internazionale's perspective, the intrigue surrounding the mini-tournament in Abu Dhabi has increased somewhat due to the 'deliver-or-be fired' sign that seems to be floating above Rafa Benitez head.

Nevertheless, there was never any danger that this competition would be taken for granted on the part of Internacional, and the consensus in Porto Alegre seems to be that Rafa's difficulty is Celso Roth's opportunity. The Spaniard's managerial counterpart has admitted to effectively having given up on trying to dispute the Brazilian league title since about two-thirds of the way through and instead focusing all his efforts on an immaculate preparation for Abu Dhabi.

Even the final games of the Brazilian championship were treated as training exercises in advance of the World Club Cup, with tactical alterations being tested and players being rested/put through their paces in accordance with the coach's masterplan.

As if that wasn't enough, hardly a day has gone by when the sports media has not reported on every possible muscular contraction or bruise emerging out of Appiano Gentile thousands of miles away. Inter di Milano's injury crisis may be worrying Massimo Moratti but it is being relished by Inter de Porto Alegre and alterations to playing strategy are being realised on this basis.

At this juncture it is best to sound a cautionary note; poor domestic and continental form is no more an indicator of how Benitez' men will perform in this very singular and special tie than is Internacional's predilection for patient, elaborative football a sign of how they will set-out to face blatantly superior opposition. What price the nerazzurri, counting on the likes of Zanetti and Maicon, will play out of their skins and generate a revival that could turn their entire season around?

As for the colorado let us bear in mind just how they won this title the last time around. In 2006, a Ronaldinho-led Barcelona was not able to break down Inter's massed ranks that included some details of man-marking. Inter nicked the game with a counter-attack in the second-half. It was a similar story the year before; a miserly Sao Paulo defeated Liverpool albeit in a manner that was not overtly different to the style of football that they usually paraded in Brazil ( playing at times with five men across the back).

So how will Roth approach this game tactically? Will he smell the blood of a stumbling Internazionale and look to capitalise on this by sending out his team in their customary open manner?

In my opinion this would be foolhardy, since recent history suggest that the only viable way for the South American club sides to topple European opponents is by sitting deep. In this year's victorious Libertadores campaign, Roth managed to push the team's defensive line up signicantly higher than is the norm in Brazil and encouraged his players to press their rivals whilst staying compact as a block. But this was generally against sides who are used to playing in a much more dispersed manner.

Consider, after all, the distances that exist between lines. Thiago Silva has spoken of the difficulties he faced after moving to Milan since at Fluminense he had been accustomed to loitering in the vicinity of his own final third. With defensive midfielders, advanced midfielders and forwards all seperated over a greater extent of pitch than one would expect to find with a European team, defensive funcitons are in theory zonal but in practice become man-to-man, such is their predictability. But now the Reds will be facing an Italian club who are used to playing in a more compact style week-in, week-out.

My own view is that whilst Roth would prefer his players to defend aggressively, he will be sensible enough to sit quite deep and in a 4-3-2-1 formation. The Christmas Tree is hardly new to Inter; indeed, their Libertadores campaign typically featured that or else a 4-2-3-1 depending on the opposition they faced. In practical terms, this equated to Roth removing one of the offensive midfielders for a more combative player when the occassion so suited.

The run-in for the domestic championship did see Internacional revert to a more Brazilian 4-2-2-2, but as mentioned above, the marking duties in such a scheme are usually mirrored in the positioning of the opponents; volantes pick up the centralised meias, the meias pick up the rival volantes and so forth.

Against the nerazzuri however, the Brazilian side would be facing a 4-2-3-1 set up with emphasis on pace and doubling-up along the flanks. Bear in mind that the Brazilian 4-2-2-2 differs from the Arsene Wenger and Manuel Pellegrini variations: whereas Arsenal and Villarreal entrusted their playmakers (Pires, Cazorla etc) to shore up the flanks when out of possession, the Brazilian equivalents usually stay central and indeed dormant for large periods in the defensive phase. It is hard to imagine that Roth will want his offensive full-backs (Kleber and Nei) to be exposed to constant 2v2s from the likes of Maicon and Pandev.

What we might see therefore is an extremely defensive midfield trivot featuring the tenacity of Pablo Guinazu, Tinga and Wilson Mattias. Note that not one of these players is really a playmaker in any sense. The former two have been used in more box-to-box roles in the past but overall the emphaisis here would be on shifting across to screen the vulnerable full-back whilst also screening the central area just in front of the back four.

Creative duties will almost exclusively be delegated to the advanced midfield pair (D'Alessandro and probably Giuliano) who will be expected to feed a lone striker, the rapid Rafael Sobis or the bulkier presence of Alecsandro. The choice of the later will largely depend on how confident Roth feels about entrusting his men with possession. The more technically adept Sobis is clearly the man to lead the line if quick counter-attacking is the order of the day. Alecsandro can hold the ball up for the encroaching pair of enganches plus the overlapping full-backs if Inter are to have any hope of elaborating their play. This would have the advantage of relieving the Brazilian side of pressure and taking the sting out of the game, rather then converting the game into a to-and-fro contest, a contest in which they could never be sure as to when they would recapture the ball.

Tactical Variations for the Clásico.

2010-11-25T21:53:00.006-02:00

Will Mourinho try a tactical variation in the Clásico at the Camp Nou?

His stated favourite platforms of play are the 4-3-3 and the 4-diamond-2, though he does tend to tweak both formats to accomodate whatever players he finds at his disposal. There has been talk of Zé Mário jettisoning the improvising presence of a mediapunta in order to beef-up the central midfield.

And yet, it's hard to imagine José Mourinho dispensing of the creativity of Mesut Oezil, even if the benefit of a midfield trivot (Alonso-Lass-Kherdira) does appeal to him. It largely depends on how badly Mourinho will want his players to hold on to the ball - and last year against Inter, Pep Guardiola saw just what a Trojan gift was his rival's renunciation of possession. So whilst the potential gains in terms of adding Lass to the central midfield are obvious - aggression and anticipation in closing down Xavi and Iniesta - surely Mourinho would be loathe to forego the asset of that immutable front four (Oezil, Cristiano, DiMaria and Higuaín) who almost alone are expected to generate solutions in the final third whenever Madrid's collective play requires something more intricate beyond the 'Alonso + raking pass = counter-attack' staple.

Oezil as a false nine?

It would be uncharacteristic of the coach, sure, since he has always tried to play with one recogniseable centre-forward (with Gonzalo Higuaín currently being the closest thing to that) - preferably a bustling targetman, and thereby having an outlet to relieve pressure when Madrid are pinned deep or else to bypass midfield during the attacking build-up. Although the rapid, surgical counter-attack is still the mainstay of this Mourinho offering, it is a modification from his Internazionale and Chelsea formats; relying less on bludgeoning rival defences so much as dizzying them with rapid interchanges among four pacey attackers.

But alongside such technical matters, we may also have to admit an element of political agenda; namely, that Higuain alone is expendable amidst the intrigue that pervades the Bernabeu club hierarchy. No matter that Mourinho way well like the Argentine striker, for all that he may value Pipita and disregard the shabby consideration which is afforded him by elements within the club and a Pérez-compliant Madridista press, the Portuguese coach has never been the type to refuse to plunge the sword where no quarter is expected and could well be imagined turning Higuain's lack of political capital to his own advantage. So basically this would make Higuain benchable, whilst leaving the annointed ones (Ronaldo, Oezil and DiMaria) in the starting line-up.

Barcelona's high-line:

The varying interpretations of the false Nine role tend to complicate life for opposing centre-backs, particularly those who are perhaps not the quickest across the ground and instead relish treading on the toes of their goalkeeper and minimising aerial balls into the box. The more torpid they are, the greater their comfort at playing deeper but this has the effect of enabling the opposing false-nine to lure said centre-backs out of their comfort zone lest they cede the numbers advantage in midfield (generated by the false nine dropping deep to combine with his own midfielders).

Alternatively, and against a relatively high defensive line, the false nine's distracting movements have the effect of setting-up those dreaded diagonal runs from the 'outside-to-in' forwards; inside of the full-back and leaving the stranded centre-back in a one-on-one situation (if indeed he is lucky to still be in contention) with the attacker.

It is not hard to imagine such a scenario in the Camp Nou with Cristiano Ronaldo, Di Maria as executors of the outside-to-in run, whilst playing against what will surely be a very high Barcelona defensive line, all aided and abetted by Oezil's inverse movements.

But one might question to what extent would Oezil's forward-to-midfield movement be a fait accompli, necessitated by the more pressing concern for Madrid; that they must prevent Barcelona from converting midfield possession into a monologue, and all the more so in the context of a technically modest trio (Xabi Alonso notwithstanding) standing athwart this procession. Therefore, Oezil might well spend most of the game lurking closer to midfield anyway to relieve the pressure on his teammates in this sector. And given that Lionel Messi could himself be acting as the false nine who drops to triangulate with Xavi and Iniesta, the pulse of the game would likely gravitate towards this central midfield area. Concurrently, the Barcelona centre-backs would be as well to let Oezil drop off and not follow him, since his main function may become less one of drawing opponents onto him and more of trying to ease telling balls into the Barcelona defensive third. And with two centre-backs staying even and holding their line, the Barcelona full-backs would have much greater impetus to station themselves higher into the middle third, thereby drawing Ronaldo and Di Maria further away from making those defence-splitting runs.

To prove this later point, just try imagining the opposite scenario; if Barcelona were to play their customary high line, if Puyol were to constantly track Oezil towards the midfield, and if Dani Alves and, say, Maxwell/Abidal were to station themselves closer to the holding midfielder, Gerard Pique would find himself playing as a de facto sweeper and ergo could be playing onside two Madrid attackers (Cristiano Ronaldo and Di Maria making those diagonal runs) with acres of space behind even him. With Puyol accompanying him more closely, the offside trap could still be activated all while at least being able to count on the security of a 2-v-2 situation (a risk which Barcelona are often happy to incur anyway, most notably whenever Pique strides forward to initiate and follow-through on attacks, and either Sergio Busquets will drop back or Eric Abidal can tuck in from wide alongside Puyol). If you will, it is a proactive and provoking way of arresting the opponents' attempts to man-up in this particular sector; rather than accepting the static picture of marking distributed before them, the defenders are willing to assume the even numbers risk by threatening to overload another sector. In the win-win scenario, the opponents would withdraw one of their attackers thereby allaying the 2v2 scenario in the first place. This is the rejection of the need for permanent cover. Marcelo Bielsa, justifying his propensity to select full-backs or defensive midfielders in a three-man backline, explained it thus:

"The important thing is to spread over the pitch well, to have a tight block, that our defenders and forwards are separated by no more than 25 metres, and that we don’t have people in defense busy marking someone who doesn’t exist."

Arrigo Sacchi, the arch-proponent of the zone, was elaborating these ideas more than two decades ago. As he told Alessandro Zauli in 2000: “Our true formation was movement… we weren’t concerned with having situations of numerical superiority at the back”.

So a game of cat and mouse could await us at the Camp Nou, albeit one of an attacking, risk-taking nature.

Who will assume the greater risk to receive the reward?

Villarreal's South American-European fusion:

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Villarreal prove that it is possible to play 4-4-2 across four lines

Above figure 1: Villarreal's 4-4-2/4-2-2-2 shape.

If Jonathan Wilson's explanatio

n as to raison d'être of the 4-2-3-1 formation is true (affording licence to playmakers and dribblers in an age of increased physicality), then little wonder it first became popularised in Spain, that country that produces a phalanx of ball-players; players who would be miscast if they were to operate as traditional box-to-box dynamos in a 4-4-2. Witness, for example Roy Hodgson's struggles to impart lessons on Liverpool's more adept ball players, or more pointedly, Joe Cole's entire history as a young footballer.

Another reason perhaps why 4-2-3-1 is advantageous to such players, is that it enables them to defend higher up the pitch. When their team recovers possession, the creators are in closer proximity to both their own forwards and to their opponent's goal. Closer, in other words, to their natural habitat, to their comfort zone. Clearly you would not want to see the likes of Joe Cole or Theo Walcott vainly huffing and puffing inside their won final third.

It is a staple of tactics-centred discussion that formation is not an absolute but a neutral template subject to the holistics of exploiting player characteristics. From this principle can be extrapolated a further observation; the formation (based on average starting position) is not the shape a team will adopt during defensive phase, with teams switching to one or even two seperate configurations depending on the mome

nt of play. As Rafa Benitez said of 4-2-3-1; it can transform itno a 4-3-3 (4-2-1-3) or a 4-4-1-1 depending on the human material available and the manager's preferred model of play or his overriding specific objectives for the game at hand. Clearly some formations are more congenial to certain transformations than others due to the simplest of positional adjustments, and so 4-3-3 can become 4-1-4-1 or 4-2-3-1, 4-4-2 invariably morphs into 4-4-1-1, 4-3-1-2 tends to become 4-3-2-1 and even 4-2-2-2 can be transformed into a 4-2-3-1 through the application of one of the strikers.

Internazionale under Jose Mourinho played a 4-2-3-1 (that became 4-4-1-1 in the defensive stage) but that, under a different coach with a different set of proirities and the same group of players, may well have been rendered it a 4-2-1-3 (becoming 4-2-3-1 in defensive phase). [This seemed to be the intention that Rafa Benitez was entertaining at the start of the 2010-11 Serie A season; a more pro-active Inter stationed further up the pitch which in theory would alleviate Samuel Etoo' and Goran Pandev of much defensive burden. This plan of course has been overturned by an unseemingly concession on the part of Benitez towards positional autonomy and tactical assymetry largely at the behest of Samuel Etoo, with the result that Inter now resemble a leftward-inclining 4-2-2-2 whenever Milito dislodge

s the Cameroonian international towards a nominal wide role].

All of the above permutations are in adherence to the near-universal truth that top-flight teams nowadays can no longer afford to work less than nine men behind the ball (Fabio Capello dixit), the dilemna is one of how to configure these nine men in an effective manner without causing total distortion of their natural game. For certain players, there must be a compromise made between standing around idly and tracking back all the way to their own corner flag.

We have seen in recent yea

rs, the past three seasons to be specific, the disturbance rendered by teams trying to not just tweak their formation, but thinking they can do so without overhauling their model of play. Arsenal, in a post Vieira-context, come to mind. That their 4-3-3 and 4-2-3-1 variants have not made them less vulnerable to conceding goals is due to a lack of intensity in their pressing, and not necessarily ferocity in the tackle. The football is arguable more expansive than ever but they are playing with the purpose and effectiveness of the lacsadaisacal Barcelona side of 2007-2008, going through the motions, usually comfortable but never quite convincing. This is largely borne of a side and a manager whose platform of play was built around defending relatively deep, absorbing pressure and then hitting teams on incisive ball-to-feet counter-attacks.

Yes, the Arsenal of the 2001-02 or even the Invincibles vintage could elaborate play to the point of dizzying opponents but this was tempered by two factors:

firstly, Arsenal's most convincing wins when coupled with poised and deliberative build-up play came at a time when in the Premier league many more mid-to-lower table teams played a very open, vertical and naive form o

f football. These green pastures abounded before inferior teams began to employ their essentially negative take on 4-5-1 and set-up camp around their own final third. Put simply, teams are no longer pouring forward and affording the Gunners ample space to cut through them on the occassion of counter-attacks.

Secondly, there is the small matter of Europe: can it be purely coincidence that Wenger's most successful foray into Europe came only in 2005-06 after switching to 4-2-3-1 for European encounters? It was seen at the time as a concession towards negativity, but in reality with an extra playmaker between the lines it helped Arsenal masticate possession as well as defend more effectively.

That older Arsenal (2000-2005) was a side which tended to switch from 4-2-2-2 to a 4-4-2 in defensive phase. The strikers were exempt of defensive duties whilst the wide playmakers were expected to align themselves with the rock-solid central midfielders in a line of engament, but in order to avoid space between their back four and midfield opening it was necessary to move the two banks close together; effectively Arsenal had two lines of defence which were usually stationed deep-to-medium high, which means that the midfield line (the first one to pressurise opponents) would either set up on the cusp of its own final third or else just inside its own half, respectively. Of course, the amount of times this would happen was barely noticeable since the proportion of time spent without the ball by Arsenal, who maintained possession much better than

did their domestic opponents anyway, was miniscule.

And even when forced into such a position, the side was blessed with quick passers and fast runners like Pires, Ljunberg and Henry so that the counter-attack was surgically effective and quick.

Those sides were also predicated on a defensively solid double pivot in midfield drawn from two of Vieira, Edu and Gliberto Silva. The departures of Vieira and Edu was monumentous in its implications for the sides playing style from 2005 onwards, for although Wenger would spend the next three seasons mai

ntaining the same formation (4-2-2-2), his promotion of Cesc Fabregas changed the complexion of the midfield. Shorn of Vieira's industry, the team was left with only one fetching midfielder (Gilberto or Flamini) covering now for three ball-players instead of two.

Of surpreme importance here was the defensive contribution and positional intelligence of Robin Van Persie from about 2007 until 2009. Even when playing as a strike partner to Emmanuel Adebayor, he consistently would drop off to form a first barrier of defence in the midfield; which meant that Arsenal could switch to 4-4-1-1 in defensive phase. More enticingly, the Gunners could even afford to allow their wide playmakers to partipate in pressing higher up the pitch (now more medium than low) in what was effectively a advanced midfield band of three (Hleb/Ljunberg on the right, Van Persie central and Rosicky/Nasri on the left); so 4-2-2-2 could become 4-2-3-1 when necessary. Arsenal were demonstrably more comfortable with this medium pressing during this transition period of 2007-09 than their confused attempts in a Barcelonaesque guise since 2009. Perhaps a return to this intermediary template might be recommended if the experiment with 4-3-3 continues to prove anaemic.

For a side who look effortlessly assured in a 4-2-2-2, one need not look further than Villarreal. When this team met Arsenal during the March 2009 Quarter-finals of the Champions League, both were playing lar

gely identical formations. At time I recall saying that Manuel Pellegrini's men would essentially be facing a more athletic version of themselves and it largely panned out. But the larger corpus of Pelle

grini's work at Villarreal from 2004-2009 offers encouragement for those who wish to build an side who will elaborate the ball but away from the popular 4-2-3-1 and 4-3-3 boilerplate.

Manuel Pellegrini's template was restored by current coach Juan Carlos Garrido following a brief parenthesis under Valverde who tried to introduce a Sacchian 4-4-2 based on high defensive line and hard running; didn't really suit the players' style. Basically, under Valverde they resembled a Premier League but they were foresaking their heritage; born of a South American style at a continental European tempo, like a Wenger side but without the physical intensity nor explosiveness. Like a traditional Wenger side they didn't initiate pressing until midfield or sometimes even deeper so as to invite opponents forward and leave space for counter-attack. Like Arsenal, two wide midfielders provided pause and playmaking, this figure rising to three whenever they switched to 4-2-3-1.

There is a tactical reason as to why South Americans find playing in Villarreal to be such a soft landing.

What is noticeable is just how

important an element is proximity in the passing game of sides like Villarreal.They like to triangulate when going forwa

rd, always in the vicinity to one another. Pellegrini said that all five channels of attack must eventually be occupied, but not by designated personnel

Brazilian journalist Rodrigo Leitão from the coaching website Universidade de Futebol has called this Wenger/Pellegrini shape a "U-shaped midfield" as a sort of compromise between the flat midfield four and the pure box midfield of Brazilian and Colombian sides; the former is more conducive to defensive cohesion whilst the later privileges the twin central playmakers. Pellegrini's model allows the wide playmakers to converge centrally when the side has possession, but they must return to defend the flanks during defensive phase. Brazilian playmakers on the other hand have no such obligations, usually opting to loiter centrally just behind their two strikers whilst leaving the grim work of assisting the exposed full-backs to the defensive midfield duo behind them (hence the prevalence of 'broken teams' in Brazilian football).

Apart from the ever-prevelant 4-3-1-2 enganche set-up, the Villarreal model is the most widely imitated interpretation of 4-4-2 across the South American continent. This is true of sides like Nacional of Uruguay, Lanús of Argentina and it was true of the River Plate coached by Pellegrini back in 2003 who caused a furore by moving D'Alessandro out to a wide position. Similar charges of sacrilege were laid at the Ricardo LaVolpe upon his return to Argentina in 2006 to coach Boca Juniors. The arguments laid forth by LaVolpe were practically self-evident: that without a singular fixed enganche, it becomes less easy for opponents to mark such a crucial player out of a game, and since the playmakers will spend much of the match swapping flanks and rarely static, assigning man-marking duties will be a big ask anyway. All that

is asked of the playmaker in return is a little more mobility and a willingness to work behind

the ball, as lesson which Deco and Luka Modric (and even a re-born D'Alessandro playing in Brazil) have taken on board, alas something which Pellegrini clearly failed to impart upon an intransigent Juan Roman Riquelme in 2007.

Garrido's current format heralds a return to the successful and entertaining ways of old. In Pellegrini's final year the wide playmakers (interiores-mediapuntas) were two from Robert Pires, Ariel Ibagaza and the injury-ridden Santiago Cazorla. Now Borja Valero joins a rehabilitated and delectable Cazorla for the 'wide' postions. When in possession they are rarely far from each other (even if one stretches the play, the other will invariably shift across to a central area much like Pires and Ljunberg did at Arsenal).

Since a central tenet of the Villarreal philosophy is that width be fluctuating and never permanent, mobility across the front line is as essential as the presence of attacking full-backs. At least one striker ought to be comfortable drifting out to the flank (as per Thierry Henry) and Garrido is blessed to be able to call upon two of the quickest strikers around; Giuseppe Rossi and Nilmar who has proved a perfect replacement for Nihat. That both forwards have doubled as wingers for their respective national sides gives an idea as to their pace. Perhaps the Yellow Submarine has been lacking the Plan B of a more muscular, fixed reference in front of goal since the departures of Joseba Llorente, Guille Franco and Jozy Altidore, but now they have a mobile and technically-giifted quarted in front of holding midfielders Marcos Senna and Bruno. Another option is to replace Senna with the more lightweight yet technically gifted Cani.

Figure 2 below: Villarreal attack - the wide-midfielders move into central areas, whilst a striker takes up a wide position.

It is a common sight to see one of the interiores, a full-back and a striker all whirling around along one flank, only to switch the play if and when the attack becomes congested. The maxim remains the same - three players must be in proximity in order to exchange passes at all times- and it is as much as defensive as an offensive principle; the higher the chances are off ball retention.

Below: Fig 3: Villarreal in defensive phase: pressure begins inside own half and 4-1-3-2 (Senna pressing alongside widemen), before becoming two flat banks of four stationed deep when necessary.

In defensive phase, the team can afford to keep both strikers relatively high since the midfield tends to drop off, conserve energy and only press the ball once inside their own half (whilst arming a potential counter-attack). Nilmar and Rossi are such livewires that they can be entrusted to find sp

ace along any of the five channels in the opponents' half regardless of whereabouts across the pitch they find themselves, thereb

y justifying the deeper positioning of the two banks of four.

Game Changer: the moment Rijkaard's Barcelona came to life

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Real Madrid 1-2 Barcelona, April 2004, Estadio Santiago Bernabeu

For Madrid, the result was merely confirmation of what had been a deflating title run-in and the first in a series of chastenings for the hitherto Midas-like touch of Florentino Pérez. For Barcelona, the victory was not enough to propel them past a Valencia who were on their way to collect the second La Liga title of Rafa Benitez' reign.

Recall that the merengues had started the 2003-04 season with the discarding of Claude Makélélé which, whatever the financial merits of the deal, was rendered all the more crass for the depreciative and exaggerated comments made by Perez surrounding the future Chelsea player's footballing ability. What proved to be even more debilitating was the dismissal of Vicente Del Bosque when the party celebrating his landing of the 2002-03 title had nary turned cold.

Of the Del Bosque affair , one can say that Valdano and Pérez's justifications - the cited need for a more "modern" and "scientific" coach who would administer an aristocratic dressing-room with personal dettachment- were unconvincing to say the least. That the appointee should be Carlos Queiroz, who had a proven track record of developing young players, was not necessarily inconsistent with the Perez regime's raison d'etre; "Zidanes and Pavones". Queiroz would fabricate a generation of superlative tyros, so the thinking went. His technocracy need not have been an impediment either; witness his role in honing Manchester United's all-conquering 'strikerless' system later in the decade - an oeuvre borne out of the innovative approach displayed by his Portugal youth sides of the early 90s.

No, what was disconcerting about the direction which the Madrid project was taking was that they had dismissed Del Bosque as a 'yes man' for the bootroom and, even more patronisingly, as a tactical naïf; notions which Sid Lowe has pointedly dynamited in the wake of the Salamantine coach's lifting of the World Cup in South Africa. The Real Madrid of the Florentinatum between 2000 and 2003 should have been, by rights, a dysfunctioning circus. And yet Del Bosque managed to foster tactical cohesion on a squad that was never even remotely his in design and no matter the imbalance in superstar-plus-rookie player acquisitions the board would hoist upon him during each transfer window, Madrid did not implode; they won titles.

All of which brings us to the matter at hand; a retrospective of a game, primarily from a tactical viewpoint, which was sapphism for the doomed Queiroz project and a declaration of intent for the Barcelona of Rijkaard and Ronaldinho who would soon initiate a renaissance for the blaugrana club. It was the signalling of the end of a hegemony in Spain, the end to an inferiority complex and the opening-up of a marriage between style and success.

As to the individuals: who to hail as protagonists?

For Barcelona the obvious candidate is Ronaldinho whose scooped pass to set up the winner was symptomatic of the club's new-found confidence. Edgar Davids, acquired on loan from Juventus during mid-season, would offer tenacity and positional nous to the central midfield and take up the slack for his more artistically inclined teammates. What to say about the then 34-year old Phillip Cocu, versatility incarnate, who would switch back to central defence as the second half wore on.

Most tangible, above all, is the appreciation one can hold for Xavi given his presence on today's global stage. I recall the moment of disbelieving marvel, watching in a bar in Alicante mostly populated by Madridistas, when Xavi uncharacterisically ghosted into the box to flick, Matrix-style, an looping volley over the head of Casillas in defiance of a Madrid defence which had gone to sleep trying to execute the offside trap. Butterfly from a cocoon moment? Remember that Xavi up until December 2003 had always played as a holding midfielder, having been groomed to inherit the No.4 shirt from Guardiola. Now he was playmaking but across a greater expanse of the turf.

Madrid? That Esteban Cambiasso, still boasting a hairline, would be shipped out to Internazionale at the season's end was perhaps the ultimate proof of what Steve McManaman would alude to when identifying Florentino's inconsideration of that 'middle-class' of players. Indeed, Cambiasso would go on to demonstrate to all and sundry that a so-called middle-class player, with some support and guidance, can later become a very, very upper-middle class player and exactly the kind of stabilising presence that Real Madrid have been lacking in midfield over recent seasons.

Overall, it was hard to avoid the impression that Queiroz was, by this stage, scrambling for solutions in an improvised midfield pairing. Granted, Cambiasso was not yet the finished article, but his midfield partner Beckham was postionally horrible. Effectively, Beckham was entrusted with playing as fetcher and bulldog to Cambiasso's orchestrator which meant that the England man had to be everywhere and one place at the same time. This is a role better suited for players with the ferocity of Genaro Gattuso or Owen Hargreaves and even then they are effectively playing as appendages for other more tempered holding players. Makelele and Mascherano naturally are two examples of how game-reading and positional discipline is an artform in a situation where most players struggle to adjudicate the right balance between contrasting prerequisites of energetic combativeness and serene concentration.

Figure 2)

In the absence of such an enforcer, and revelling in his slightly more advanced role (though not quite stationed between the lines), Xavi had the freedom of the park to exchange short passes with Ronaldinho and Overmars and even to work his way into the box (See figure 2 above).

So now for the numbers part, the splitting of the hairs. Were Barcelona playing a 4-2-3-1, a 4-3-3 or something in between?

Figure 3) Barcelona's closely operating midfield triangle.

My own impressions are that though Xavi was playing slightly ahead of Davids and Cocu, he was not starting from a seperate band; this was still a tight three-man midfield (see Figure 3) and one which seemed to avoid the potential problems diagnosed in such scenarios by Jonathan Wilson in his recent meditations on the related subjects of 4-2-1-3 and 'broken teams'. To summarise: Cocu held the deepest position just ahead of the centre-backs whilst Davids, barely ahead of him married energy to criteria in shuttling around to shore up various sectors with his harassing and pressing. Xavi started from the same latitude as per his current Barcelona position, namely that of an interior something of a 'box-to-box' playmaker (as confusing as that may sound). The Argentine term No.8 seems the best description of a position which, in terms of positioning and movement if not necessarily style, lies somewhere between the No.5 (deep-lying) and No.10 role.

In purely static terms, this meant that Barcelona left a gulf of space in central areas between the midfield and the front trio of Saviola (later Kluivert) flanked by Ronaldinho and Overmars but this turned out to offer something of an advantage. To paraphrase Roy Hodgson, Ronaldinho would "sag" back from Michel Salgado on the left flank, almost level with Xavi, and draw Salgado towards him. This in turn would create a vacuum between the inside- and outside-left channels towards which centre-forward Saviola would drag either one of the centre-backs (Helguera and the erstwhile full-back Raul Bravo). Concommitantly, Ronaldinho had two options; he could bear down diagonally on goal through the space between the Madrid right-full-back and centre-backs, or could also shift laterally into the centre, right on the verge of the final third so that he would temporarily occupy the unassigned 3/4 role which then Xavi, in turn would either opt not to clutter or else move forward in support of the Brazilian (see Figure 5 further below).

Cambiasso and, primarily Beckham, were left in a dilemna. Either one of them should drop deep to fill the vacated space in Madrid's back line (in light of Saviola's distraction of a centre-back) and yet leave the Ronaldinho-Xavi duet in a 2 v1 situation (against the man who stayed) and with ample time to orchestrate an attack some 40-50 yards from goal. Alternatively, they left the back line exposed to an infiltration from Ronaldinho himself or an out-to-in returning Saviola.

Even Madrid's capacity to shift their back-line across the width of the box as per the classic mechanism of a functioning back-four was compromised by Roberto Carlos' situation on the opposite flank. With Marc Overmars stationed high and wide, and on his stronger right-foot, it was less likely that the Dutchman would cut inside, at least not until reaching close to the byline, and this left the Madrid full-back isolated from his fellow defenders. To what extent Overmars was fulfilling a defensive as well as offensive role in keeping Roberto Carlos pinned back relatively subdued is open to debate; certainly the Brazilian persisted in advancing but this generated an abundance of space for Overmars and even his full-back Reiziger to launch forward into. With Cambiasso finding himself having to come to the aid of Madrid's vacant left-flank, the spaces for Xavi to dictate the game were amplified.

Offence-wise, Madrid were none too shabby. In a recogniseable 4-2-3-1, Raul fulfilled much the same brief as Saviola did for the opposition. Twenty-six years old and already a veteran, the Madrid idol was expected to perform his striking duties without the aid of an injured Ronaldo, and considering he was never really a pure centre-forward, he acquitted himself quite well, demonstrating intelligence through his economical movement and generating linking up well with the advanced midifeld trio of Zidane (left) Solari (centre) and Figo (right). The assigning of these positions is perhaps unsatisfactory since Zidane always tended to move infield whereas Solari was at ease in wide areas (as per Figure 4 below)

Only Figo stayed relatively wide, out on the right, and even then he often lauched diagonal runs. In praise of Figo, he avoided predictability by alternating extremely well with Michel Salgado; one minute the Portuguese would stretch the play to allow the full-back to storm diagonally run through the inside-right channel, the next he himself would move infield to facilitate the overlap for Salgado (see Figure 5 below)

The result was that Madrid often found themselves about 30 yards out from Barcelona's goal and with any four from Zidane, Solari, Figo and Salgado converging within a central area. Given the positional diligence of Phillip Cocu, not to mention the tirelessness of Edgar Davids, Madrid would constantly run into a forest of bodies, which they themselves would further populate and to the point where they invariably took shots from distance. This may paid have dividends in generating the the opening goal; which in truth was as much due to Barcelona's failure to clear a rebounded shot, but this breakthrough only came in the second-half when Queiroz's men were patently running out of ideas for attacking alternatives. Three minutes later, Barcelona would equalise with a goal which cruelly exposed Madrid's lack of defensive synchronisation; Roberto Carlos dawdling on-side whilst the defensive line pushed out, thereby allowing Van Bronkhurst to burst through and lift a ball for Kluivert (who had subbed Saviola) to head home virtually unopposed.

From there on out, the match settled into a pattern so familiar to us now; Barcelona patiently probing in possession - albeit punctuated by the incisiveness of Ronaldinho and Overmars' dribbling - and Madrid chasing shadows.

The Battle for Midfield

Figure 6) In terms of shape, Barcelona's midfield takes on a squared Brazilianesque appearance. Here we witness the benefits of no one Barça player permanently occupying the hole: Xavi moving forward, Ronaldinho drifting infield and Madrid do not know who to pick-up and how.

In Figure 6 we notice how Davids has stolen the ball from Figo in the inside-left channel just inside Barcelona's half. Instead of laying off the ball to whichever one of his centre-backs was not being marked, or even making a lateral pass to Van Bronckurst to his left, the Dutchman chose to exploit Figo's stranded status by advancing into midfield thus creating an overload. Solari has opted to sit very deep to keep tabs on Xavi, whose influence on the game had been growing, instead of trying to join Zidane and Figo in engaging the opponents earlier inside the Barcelona half. With Figo scrambling to get back behind the ball, Raúl dutifully tracks back so that Zidane would not be completely outnumbered in trying to stem Cocu and Davids from progressing. Yet for all Figo and Raúl's willingness, there was a palpable lack of intensity to Madrid's pressing game; uncoordinated, perhaps unrehearsed to the point where Puyol and Oleguer, not to mention Reiziger and Van Bronckhurst found themselves at times with no Madrid player available to close them down. Thus Barcelona were able to carry the ball out with relative ease either centrally (by passing their way in triangles through the outnumbered white shirts) or laterally through their advancing full-backs.

Another tell-tale sign of how improvised was Madrid's pressing tactic is the distance left between defensive lives, namely the first and second lines of pressure in midfield. Seperating the advanced trio (in this moment Figo, Raul and Zidane) from the central duo (Beckham and Cambiasso - who is just out of picture about 5 yards behind Ronaldinho) is a distance of some 20 yards which is remarkable when you consider the following...

Arrigo Sacchi's Milan tried to defend in two banks of four and no further than 12 metres apart. Jose Mourinho prefers his teams, regardless of formation, to defend in three banks, which he feels permits them to cover a greater expanse of the pitch. With roughly 7 metres seperating each line that amounts to 21 metres but this feat is only possible thanks to the midway presence of the holding midfielders. In the case of this particular match incident, the advanced-midfield line and the back four are so far apart (some 25 metres) that not even the endeavour of Beckham (seen here rushing to close down Davids) can bridge this chasm; Madrid have allowed themselves to be stretched, at a time when the liberalisation of the offside law had yet to be introduced, to the point where their advanced midfielders are as distant from the back four as were the strikers in Sacchi's two-band system! At any rate, Beckham's lot here is unenviable; his interception has left space behind for Ronaldinho (again, having sagged and drifted infield) to receive the ball and yet he must do something to reduce the gap since Cambiasso, clearly dreading Ronaldinho's capacity to turn and accelerate (does this not make anyone nostalgic?) has opted to drop off almost as deep as his central defenders.

Aftermath

This was the embryonic version of the present-day Barcelona set-up. Over the next two seasons, two league titles and the Champions League would follow whilst Rijkaard's team would go about consolidating their 4-3-3 set-up, all with significant variations on the template offered here. Cocu moved back to the Netherlands and would be be replaced by Edmilson from Lyon. The front three would preserve the same structure with Ronaldinho featuring on the left and Ludovic Giuly offering a like-for-like swap for Marc Overmars. Of course, Samuel Etoo would provide a degree of physical intensity and application which were not the repetoire of Saviola nor Kluivert and thus Barcelona could escalate their pressing game. The all-action role of Davids was replicated by the arrival of Mark Van Bommel, but an greater element of creativity was to be added in the form of Deco and Andrés Iniesta competing for the other midfield berth alongside Xavi. Now Rijkaard would be able to configure his midfield trio according to whether steel or art was required by the situation.

Mano's Brazil Project for 2014 (or more likely 2012)

2010-07-26T19:04:00.000-03:00

By now you will doubtless have heard that the CBF (Brazilian Football Federation) have appointed Luiz Antônio Wenker 'Mano' Menezes to take over the reins of the national team from Dunga. So naturally, the question most readers will be asking (at least around these parts) is how his new Brazil will play. Let's take a superficial look before delving into detail futher ahead.

As for the man himslef, why not let his own words convey his tactical philospophy he intends to impart to the team? This from Monday's (26th July) press conference at his official unveiling in Rio de Janeiro:

"When looking in the sphere of club sides, mostly Brazilian clubs, I don't see much possibility for you to choose a manner of playing and say "Right, we're gonna play this way and this is always the ideal way", but in the case of the Brazilian national team, where you can indeed choose the players, and almost always the best players, to establish a mode of playing, I think it is possible".

" I like to play mostly a 4-2-3-1, which we have seen a lot of during the World Cup, and which in 2006 was the formation I used at Gremio in Porto Alegre where we enjoyed a fine championship... because it gives you that option - it's always good for you to have offensive power - it gives you play down the flanks, there is 'arrival' coming from (the midfield) behind, there is the saída (carrying out of the ball) by the volantes (defensive midfielders)- nowadays saída is very important for providing support, and the European clubs are using a triangle in the midfield and three players further ahead, so perhaps this is route we take over the next few years".

- Mano is the third gaúcho (from Brazil's southernmost state) to occupy the position in this past decade, the other two being Luiz Felipe Scolari and Dunga. A lot of socio-political commentary is being extrapolated from this as to the significance of this trend and whether this affects the culture and playing style of Brazilian football. Much of this, in my opinion, is exaggerated and some of it is even erroneous but it is a tangible currency and satisfies people's perceptions (even inside of Brazil) as to generalities.We will touch on this later in the article.

- The new coach has a solid, if unspectacular curriculum. What is noteworthy is that he has only ever been fired by one of his clubs and as a rule he tends to honour contracts, something laudable in the cut-throat world of Brazilian domestic football with its dizzying turnover of managers. From a practically non-existant playing career (as a non-league centre-back), a P.E. teaching qualification, through regional lower-league coaching up to big club management, notably rescuing relegated giants Grêmio and Corinthians, Menezes has gone about things his way.

The eternal-romantic Sócrates, in an interview with Alex Bellos from the Observer, put forth some opinions and this caused a ripple in the southern media. The bearded legend made a facile (though perhaps not wholly inaccurate) portrayal of southern Brazilians as being harbingers of a joyless, defense-minded football natural to their condition as political and cultural reactionaries in the economically more prosperous south. Pehaps Dunga's demeanour cut an easily identifiable figure for those non-southern Brazilians who sought a pin-up for this archetype, but Mano, like Dunga also of German descent, is popular with the Paulista press whilst still commanding respect in the south and seems to have avoided being pidgeon-holed by the court of popular opinion.

One of the most vexing things about the derisory "European' libel being leveled at those Brazilian coaches who play in a more pragmatic style, is that this very defensiveness has been a purely Brazilian creation, borne out of a need to address the advancing physicality of global football in the 1980s and not some product of European-led evangelisation nor some ham-fisted native attempts at pale imitation.

Yes it is true that many teams such as the West German sides of Jupp Duvall and later Franz Beckenbauer, and to an extent the Italy of Enzo Bearzot, layed out a defensive roadmap for football over the decade, what with their man-marking, three centre-backs, wing-backs etc and would indeed inspire countless imitators across the Old Continent and beyond- but they should no means be re-written as the embodiment of European football's evolution in that decade.

For starters, you had the thoroughly pleasing-on-the-eye game of Portuguese sides that produced Paulo Futre and the 1987 European Cup winners Porto, not to mention Johann Cruyff's tenure as manager of Ajax in the mid-80s and his committment to an ultra-expansive game.

Rather, what we can surmise from the above examples is that there was no singular 'European' football in opposition to a Brazilian or South American style but rather distinctive and diverging ways in which many nations decided to deal with the game's increasing athletic demands. As Tim Vickery succintly noted back in 2007 when lamenting the road taken by Brazilian coaches post-1982, Holland took a pro-active approach by means of initiating pressing (the lessons of which would soon permeate through top-level European football to varying degrees until this very day), the Argentines found this forced and unnatural and so kept their leisurely short-passing game under Menotti- only increasing the tempo of their passing when faced by onrushing opponents such as the Dutch.

Brazil? Well, Brazil opted to beef up their midfield and fragment the team into sectors of responsibilty, hoping that moments of inspiration, the vestiges of their malandragem culture (a quality akin to 'cheekiness', or the 'evasiveness' of a rascal as demonstrated by the street footballer) could settle differences in the final third. Those fleeting flashes of brilliance you saw exhibited at the World Cup between the Luis Fabiano-Kaká- Robinho triangle on the edge of the opponents' 18-yard area are the epitome of malandragem.

Judging by the style his teams have adopted, Mano seems to have broken with this Brazilian conceit, which is something of a paradox. He hails from the most 'European' part of the country (not only in terms of ethnicity but also societal habits, expectations and economic practices) and this is the region whose football is perhaps most doggedly entrenched in the 'two defensive-midfielders' made-in-Brazil school. Indeed, the club at which he made his name known nationwide, Grêmio Fußball Porto-Alegrense, has long cherished the tradition of dogged and distruptive midfield play. Yet Mano at times fielded a Mourinhoesque 4-1-4-1/4-3-3 back in 2006, complete with medium-pressing and doubling-up on the flanks, something of a novelty in Brazilian football - and this with a Grêmio side who were playing in the second division.

What is particularly encouraging for this blogger, who bores anyone who might care to listen, is that the crippling heroin of Brazilian football, namely the central midfield presence of the destructive 'volantes', is something that Menezes has demonstrated a willingness to eschew. This staple of the Brazilian diet has been a constant since 1994 and although Mano has never exactly fielded an Alonso-style playmaking 'centre-half' (let us not even fantasise about a Pirlo-esque regista), when he does play with a double-pivot he at least ensures that one of them is something of a box-to-box all rounder (as was Lucas, now of Liverpool, under his command). When Mano has opted for the 'high triangle' (one holder plus two slightly more advanced midfielders) at least one of the two interiores tends to be a playmaker.

Featuring amongst the new manager's call-up is the implausibly elegant Hernanes who remains a beacon of creativity amongst central midfielders in the domestic game, a fine foil for the more technically-limited and destructive pivot Sandro (Spurs fans, do not expect displays of creativity from this guy, who in my opinion would make a finely composed centre-back). Paulo Henrique 'Ganso' is a more advanced playmaker, a languid trequartista more adept at threading together midfield with the forwards, his game begins on the edge of the final third. Feather-lite livewire Neymar will be expected to follow Robinho's example in a Brazil shirt and marry tactical application along the flanks with incisive running and dribbling.

The new coach wasn't just being courteous when he indicated that he would not tear down the Brazilian side edified during Dunga's mandate. Menezes sensibly acknowledges that the 2007-2010 vintage displayed a level of concentration and professionalism that, sheared of its cloistered training arrangements, its former boss's paranoia towards the media, and not to mention its ideological posturing (witness Dunga's snipes towards the 'losers' of 1982 and even the 'overrated' side of 1970!), does provide a template any coach-elect would dream of inheriting.

In short, we are not likely to see a side anywhere near as expansive as Spain or more forgiveably Barcelona, but we might well see a side not unsimilar to the young German mannschaft. Much more than Dunga's set-up, this will truly be a more recogniseably 'European' or rather a more 'globalised' Brazil side, one which is tune with the tactical demands of elite club competion, such as the Champions' League where the best Brazilian footballers in the world display their talents within a coherent framework. There will be a higher defensive line. The forwards and advanced midfielders will engage in pressing. The central midfielders will have to serve some purpose with the ball rather than kick lumps out of people and act as appendages to the centre-backs. The full-backs (both of them) will have to alternate their forays forward and shift across in 'basculation' movement. And Brazilian media will sit up and take notice. Already fans on the street and the blogosphere has; the Premier League, La Liga, Bundesliga, Le Championnat, even the Russian league are broadcast on Brazilian satelite TV. Such observers react and respond to the trends within the game at large and will not settle for the stale analysis of mainstream Brazilian commentators nor their lazy paradigms and ill-informed debates ('defensive vs offensive', 'South American -vs-European football', '4-4-2 or 3-5-2 is the only formation worth playing', et bloody cetera.)

Mano Menezes will simply be easing Brazil into the milieu of modern football which is not necessarily European, or any the less Brazilian for that matter. After all, Brazilian coaches were the ones who buried Brazilian football; now a Brazilian coach will take tentative steps to resurrecting it.

Will he have time and the necessary backing to do so by the time of the 2012 Olympics?

Spain: the need for llegada sees double pivot discarded

2010-06-19T18:03:00.000-03:00

The post-mortems following La Furia's defeat to Switzerland have raised questions that have left inconclusive and divisive interpretations: did Spain lack attacking width? If so, was stretching the attack and launching high crosses the most conducive plan to discomforting the massed ranks of Swiss who defended with the solidity of their medieval Landsknechts forebearers?

Was Spain's conglomeration of playmakers in central areas necessarily doomed to stagnate from the beginning, or would the same set-up have flourished (as it often had during the qualifiers) had only the Spaniards circulated the ball with more urgency?

Two issues, however, do seem to have struck a common denominator with those critics of Del Bosque's tactical plan for the opening group game in Durban.

The first points to the redundancy of Spain's doble pivote of Xabi Alonso and Sergio Busquets (despite their undeniable technical attributes) when facing against sides such as Switzerland and Honduras who will display a reserved game plan.

The second gripe is not unrelated to the first, and it concerns the presence (or lack thereof) of llegada, or breaking into the box, arriving as a surprise element for second balls and generally just shooting! Xabi Alonso can launch thunderbolts from distance but he tends to do so only when the play has stalled to a static stage with the opposition defence already amassed on the edge of its 18-yard box. What is needed to punctuate Spain's neat mastication of passes when approaching the final third is a dynamic presence, the arrival of a midfielder who will break the lines and carry the ball beyond the defensive barrier(s) before either culminating or else setting up another attacker.

It would appear that the stage is set for Cesc Fàbregas to enter. That he is a playmaker who has acquired a box-to-box verticality to his game since maturing in the Premier League, we know all too well. If reports from Spain's training camp are to be believed, Del Bosque is all but guaranteed to add Cesc to the line-up for the Honduras clash and this adjustment will coincide with other team changes which interest us on a tactical level.

Once consequence of Cesc's inclusion will be the reassignment of Xabi Alonso to the centre as sole holding midfielder, thereby excluding the other holding player Sergio Busquets. There is an argument as to whether Busquets might acquit himself better in a lone-anchor role than would Alonso, who lacks the dynamism (in terms of speed of movement) and thus seldom has been entrusted with such a brief at top-level football over the past few years. The argument that overrides such concerns and supports the inclusion of Alonso has two facets; negative - the likelyhood that Honduras will probably sit very deep (thereby aleviating much of the destructive component of this positional portfolio) - and positive: with Spain needing to stretch play by occupying more areas of the pitch and speeding up their circulation of the ball, the Basque midfielder's inimitable long-range passing becomes a vital tool for rapidly switching play across the pitch.

A further effect of these changes will be to change the role of David Villa somewhat; irrespective of formation.

Fernando Torres looks set to start to add a further striking presence alongside Villa. The only question concerns the positioning of the Asturian striker, whether he will play centrally with Torres in a pairing as per Euro 2008 and the Confederations' Cup or if, more likely, he will resume a role sometimes resorted to by Del Bosque during the later qualification rounds which sees him take up an outside-left position (with one from Silva, Navas or Pedro mirroring these duties over on the right flank). I say "more likely" since this second arrangement affords Del Bosque the option of simply alternating between 4-4-2 and 4-3-3 depending on the circumstances of the match and without having to utilise substitutions (if Del Bosque wants pure width he can add Navas, Pedro or Mata later on, plus the battering-ram Llorente remains the 'chips-are-down' option).

As to the systems themselves, it should be clear from the diagrams below that in the case of (1) a fluid 4-4-2, it basically reprises the 4-1-3-2 template bequeathed by Luis Aragonés and is largely transformed by the positioning of Xavi who can act as an occasional auxiliary to Alonso in deep central areas. Xavi's starting position, as brilliantly dissected by Zonal Marking.net, will not be as advanced as his mediapunta/enganche role, but probably somewhat closer to his Barcelona role, where he has the play ahead of him.

David Silva and Cesc will likely start as mediapuntas interiores (advanced playmakers stationed wide) from left and right midfield respectively; with play in the middle third, both will seek to move inside and occupy the 3/4 hole behind the opposing central midfielder(s) with the result that the left-footed Silva and the right-footed Fàbregas might ocassionally switch flanks lest this movement become stale. It will also give both players the opportunity to move onto their favoured shooting foot, whilst the other remains relatively wide on his strong foot at least until the arrival of his overlapping full-back.

Figure 1 (above left): a fluid 4-4-2 as per Luis Aragonés's interpretation in 2008. It may be defined as 4-1-3-2 depending on Xavi's approximation to the other playmakers (indicated by the unbroken white line). Alonso's propensity to take long-distance shots is denoted by the broken white line. Cesc's movement is detailed as well as his arrival onto the second ball (broken white line). Note Villa's lateral movement in support of the full-backs and interiors, thereby creating triangulation.

The movement of David Villa is vital in order for this system to bear fruit. He must make wide runs to either flank so as to offer a passing triangle with Cesc/Silva and the full-back (naturally Fernando Torres would be expected to shoulder the more physical duties in central areas although it would help if he too made sorties to the wide channels). Villa's productive running all across the front line will also entail his incorporation into the first (advanced midfield) line of pressure once Spain lose possession for an extended period; he will simply slot into whichever of the three posts he finds himself closest to (the other two slots being filled by Silva and Fabregas) and so Spain's 4-4-2 shape (4-1-3-2/4-2-2-2) will become a 4-2-3-1 in acknowledgement of the Capello Dictum*.

Figure 2 (right): the 4-1-3-2 shape gives way to a 4-2-3-1 in the defensive phase. Xavi and Alonso assist the flanks rather than having the advanced trio track all the way back. This trio consists of Cesc, Villa and Silva who will take up their positions here according to whether each finds himself left, centrally or right when Spain lose possession. Villa's defensive movement is indicated by the broken yellow lines.

Villa will also sacrifice himself defensively should Del Bosque opt for his makeshift 4-3-3 formation wherein Spain's second-top goalscorer of all time would start from a position on the left of a three-man attack. David Silva in such a scenario would start from outside-right and the dynamic is best explained thus: both players start from wide-positions and move onto their strong foot, hence it is imperative that Joan Capdevila and Sergio Ramos advance with more intent from their full-back positions to provide width. Understandably this will cause concern for those who note that a) Ramos and Capdevila hardly offer the offensive prowess of Daniel Alves and Maxwell that have made this system such a success for Barcelona in recent years, and b) Villa's and Silva's inward movement might arguably lead to the same traffic congestion that hampered Spain's incisiveness in the Switzerland game. Whilst the first concern is difficult to remedy (beyond a willing application on the part of the full-backs) the second fear is misplaced, I would argue. How come?

Because playing as outside-forwards rather than wide-midfielders, Villa and Silva will look to move inside more diagonally (as opposed to horizontally), more rapidly (instead of taking their time to pick out a pass and elaborate the build-up) and more objectively (i.e. heading for goal). Basically, they will need to exploit whichever of the three inner-channels that Fernando Torres is not occupying at a given time. Accordingly, this out-to-in movement will occur at a more advanced stage of the attack and within a higher band.

Figure 3 (left): 4-3-3 as used by Del Bosque towards the latter stages of Spain's qualifiers. Again, Cesc's box to box movement is denoted by the broken white line. Silva and Villa start from outside-left and -right positions respectively in attack. Alonso remains crucial for switching the play across the field whenever the attack begins to stagnate.

Defensively, this 4-3-3 shape will morph into a 4-1-4-1, thereby facilitating a high line of pressing in which Silva and Villa will have more fixed roles along their respective flanks; Xabi Alonso will form the intermediary role (the second line of pressure) which permits the first and third lines to extend and spread out, as per the 4-2-3-1, over a vertical distance of 22 - 25 metres (something not possible in a defensive situation of two flat banks).

Figure 4 (right): 4-3-3 becomes 4-1-4-1 with Silva and Villa joining an advanced line line of pressure formed by Xavi and Cesc. This movement should already be familiar to Villa not only from the qualifiers but also from the 2006 World Cup.

Of course, this 4-3-3 set-up will benefit Xavi for obvious reasons of familiarity. Cesc will find himself in a comortable role (going by last season's instances when Arsenal played this system) which will sufficiently liberate him to rush forward onto the second ball or simply advance through the centre in lieu of the likely to be rested Andres Iniesta. But neither will it force him to play extended periods with his back to goal which is what happens when he is 'parked' between the 3/4 lines.

* = More on this later; I accept the pretentious nature of my coinage here, but it certainly describes an observable phenomenon that has been in evidence in top flight football over the past decade, so much so that the phenomena described almost appears a maxim, a dogma, certainly in professional European football.

Italy Tweaking the Imperfections on Eve of Paraguay Game

2010-06-13T21:10:00.000-03:00

Reports from Italy's training camp in Guateng suggest that Marcello Lippi is weighing up two options in terms of formation for the azzurri's match against Paraguay, but neither would entail a meaningful departure from how the team has been recently taking shape in the absence of Andrea Pirlo.

Above: Figure 1: Italy's 4-2-3-1 is apparent and defined but ill-suited to Marchisio's box-to-box game. As such, the azzurri's articulation when approaching the final third is likely to become less fluid. The yellow lines represent the adoption of defensive positioning.

It would appear that despite the less-than-convincing performances in the friendly games versus Mexico and Switzerland, Lippi is keeping faith with the 4-2-3-1 that sees Juventus' box-to-box midfielder Claudio Marchisio improvised in the treqartista role.

But Italy have also been rehearsing movements in an alternative system that can best be described (and has been by Gazzetta dello Sport) as a hybrid 4-4-2/4-3-3 and which restores Marchisio to something of a more natural role at interior-left in a tight bank of three which promptly becomes a four in the defensive phase due to Simone Pepe (or Mauro Camoranesi) being entrusted with a 'tornante' role at wide-right midfield.

A knock-on effect of this synchronisation is that Italy's left-sided attacking player (either Iaquinta or Di Natale) will be freed from most defensive duties beyond pressing the opposing right-back and may even be free to float all across the front line in channels not occupied by centre-forward Gilardino.

To my mind, Lippi's entertaining of this modification points to his common sense since the second formation simply adjusts to the natural characteristics of the human material available - or, if you prefer, the players' natural tendencies have ended up tilting the formation away from a 'square-pegs-in-round-holes' scenario and the coach has dutifully gone about formalising this osmosis, tidying things up here and there and organising the team for the defensive phase.

Above Right: Figure 2. A more cohesive shape, given the personel at hand. Di Natale (or Iaquinta) theoretically benefits from his resulting proximity to goal. The defensive phase sees two deeper banks of four being adopted.

Operation Saída (or 'exit strategy'): can Dunga fine-tune Brazil's imperfections on time?

2010-06-09T10:46:00.000-03:00

"What exit strategy?", I hear you say! This powerful Brazil team is ticking along nicely right now, entering a tournament on the back of relentless success.

Firstly, please do not take this use of the word 'exit' as a purist's cry for the canarinha to leave South Africa lest they sully our rose-tinted memories with their effective football.

Neither is this a cocky suggestion that Brazil will be heading home early.

No, rather the word "saída" is taken from footballing jargon and refers to an aspect of play. This article is a last-minute technical appraisal on how this passage of play has been commanding Dunga's attention in Brazil's training sessions and warm-up friendlies less than a week away from their curtain-rasier versus North Korea.

Put basically, 'saída' is that moment of play in which a team is carrying out the ball from defense and initiating a period of possession, whilst hopefully overcoming whatever opposition pressure being exerted by forwards.

As frequent readers of this site will know, it has long been a motif of mine to criticise the drawbacks of using overtly destructive players in the twin-holding roles and how this practice has had a corrosive effect on Brazilian football at club level, and at no other moment do the technical limitations of such players become more exposed than in the 'saida' phase of play.

But now it appears that Dunga himself can no longer ignore this; his hand has been forced by what he has witnessed in recent training sessions and warm-up games (versus Zimbabwe and Tanzania) and what he has seen has discomforted him on two levels; what posture should Brazil adopt when the opposition are working the ball out of defense and, conversely, how should Brazil themselves attempt to overcome the pressing of opposing teams when carrying the ball out?

In what is surely the authoritive analysis of the way Brazil plays, the site Zonal Marking has forensically detailed the movements and automatisms instilled in the side and has sensibly decided that the formation is neither 4-2-3-1 nor 4-3-1-2 but something in-between. Marcelo Costa, Brazilian journalist of Esquemas Táticos has represented the offensive and defensive phases of their play via video-graphics and illustrates how this assymetric formation retreats and contracts into into a deep-lying 4-3-2-1 during the defensive phase. What this means is that, once the opponents have carried the ball beyond whatever nominal hassling is offered by Luis Fabiano, a first line of engagement is formed by Robinho and Kaká, with the right-sided midfielder (Elano on recent evidence) dropping back to form a defensive platform of three in front of the back four, as illustrated below in Figure 1 (a & b).

Figures 1 a) and b): Brazil's assymetric formation (based on average starting position) takes on a more coherent shape in the defensive stage, with three relatively deep-lying defensive lines forming and Luis Fabiano disengaged to facilitate the counter-attack.

So far, this set-up has worked a treat, especially during the South American qualifiers. But now the cracks inherent in the system are beginning to surface. How so? How do they become manifest?

Having successfully negotiated the South American qualifying stages, Dunga has now turned his attentions (belatedly?) to the different challenge opposed by African, Asian but principally European teams, and this, despite the myriad contrasting styles among the nations, can be reduced to two words: pressure and pressing.

You see, until now this Brazil has made mince-meat out of the open invitation afforded by languid passing sides like Coco Basile's Argentina. It has made hard work out of breaking down cautious, stubborn and technically weaker sides such as Paraguay, Bolivia and Venezuela only to get out of jail by resorting to overwhelming firepower in the shape of set-piece bombardment. The only unorthodox challenge they were presented with took the form of Bielsa's swashbuckling Chile, who managed to score and outplay them only for Brazil to make their counter-attacking and aerial supremacy count in the end. But now, Dunga potentially faces sides who will exude these qualities but in a different mix; technically modest and yet physically imposing sides who are tactically disciplined and organised. Alternatively there are adventurous expansive footballing sides, such as Spain and Holland who, unlike Coco Basile's retro-romantic Argentina of 2007, pressure the ball in a disciplined manner when out of possession and thus punish sloppy passing from crude midfielders and defenders.

And so the stage was set for last weeks training sessions, as reported by ESPN Brasil, to focus on addressing these very points and tweaking certain tactical aspects. The results of this tinkering have left us with the tantalising prospect that Dunga may be about to disassemble his trusty starting-eleven, judging from the evidence of the Zimbabwe friendly.

The most noticeable tactical curiosity from last-week's sessions in Soweto (limited to the press whilst supporters where excluded) was that Brazil experimented with pressing the opponents' (theoretical reserve-team members') 'saída' of the ball.

As a result, for the first time, Dunga's formation truly resembled a 4-2-3-1 (see Figure 2) with Elano stepping up to form a high line of pressure alongside Kaka (middle) and Robinho (wide-left), as per the photo above, and in which the reserves are wearing white bibs. What can also be noticed here is the knock-on effect of Elano-Kaka-Robinho advancing their line of pressure; in order to reduce gaps, the double pivot of Gilberto Silva and Felipe Melo have advanced their position (aligned ith the advanced full-backs Maicon and Michel Bastos) and so too, crucially, have the centre-backs Lucio and Juan.

Figure 2: Three advanced lines; after Luis Fabiano disengages, Elano steps up to form a high line of pressing alongside Kaká and Robinho. The back line also steps up leaving Juan and Lucio distant from their own area.

The journalist Paulo Vinicius Coelho (the tactical guru of mainstream football punditry) subsequent to that very same training session commented that whilst the exercise in advancing the pressure comes as a timely and necessary adjustment, both Lucio and Juan looked noticeably uncomfortable at having to play so close to the halfway line where the duo's lack of pace was exposed by the incisive runs of reserve striker Grafite. Indeed, it is telling that at Internazionale Jose Mourinho made no bones of his intentionally deep defensive line so as not to stretch his tough-but-torpid centre-back pairing of Lucio and Walter Samuel. Furthermore, it is practically a given in Brazilian domestic football that the permanent screening presence of two destructive holders allows both centre-backs to inhabit and rarely stray far from the comfort zone of their own 18-yard box.

In a further training session, during which the players were instructed to circulate the ball with only two touches, Coelho reported back with more worrying news; that Dunga had hastily ordered for all media camera crews and bystanders with camera phones to remove themselves from the pitchside because all present had become alarmed at the difficulty that Brazil were evidently encountering in bringing the ball out of defence when submitted to pressure from the reserves (who themselves were executing the high-pressure strategy). Of particular concern was the rate at which Felipe Melo was erring simple passes.

All of this became manifest in the practise game versus Tanzania in Dar-Es-Salaam, a performance which the 1-5* drubbing could not disguise. Brazil's right-had side with Elano and Maicon looked comfortable during all phases of play, but the left-hand side suffered horribly. The constituent parts of this sector? Michel Bastos, weak positionally, and the incursions of Felipe Melo, particularly when it came to bringing the ball out from defense. Given Michel's offensive tendencies, Felipe Melo's propensity to rashly tackle becomes even more of a liability as was evidenced by some heated exchanges between the pair during the game versus Zimbabwe

- "Michel, are you trying to get me f**king killed?" berated Melo.

Then came the changes, as expected; 12th man and super-sub Daniel Alves came on for Michel at left-back whilst Ramires took over Elano's right-of-centre berth. But Brazil still presented the same problems in terms of cleanly passing their way out from their own defensive third. Something had to give and something did, but in doing so with it, has Dunga also signalled a substantive overhaul of the system?

Daniel Alves was switched over the the right-of-centre berth forming a partnership with Maicon; result? An unqualified success.

Gilberto Silva was removed for cultured left-back Gilberto (ex-Hertha Berlin and Spurs, now of Cruzeiro) who despite having played last season as a playmaking midfielder did seem more defensively disciplined than did Bastos (who emerged as a wing-back playing in a 3-5-2 in Brazil only to go on and spend most of his subsequent club career in a variety of midfield positions).

The other adjustment was the benching of Felipe Melo and the introduction of Wolfsburg's tenacious Josue as the side's sole holding midfielder, which entailed the repositioning of Ramires to a left-of-centre role in what now appeared to a more coherent diamond shape. (See diagram in Figure 4)

Figure 4: Brazil's altered shape versus Tanzania; Ramires adds dynamism to the left-of-centre midfield, Dani Alves does likewise on the right and Josué becomes the sole holding midfielder. A more distinguishable diamond midfield takes shape. Though the side does not become markedly more expansive nor creative and preserves its counterattacking vocation, the midfield does begin to err fewer passes and the left flank becomes less vulnerable than with Michel Bastos and Felipe Melo covering.

The side improved considerably, though it is hard to draw definitive conclusions given the quality of the opposition.

Even less predictable is how on earth Dunga will assimilate the lessons learned. The coach has almost made a crusade of sticking by Felipe Melo through times of doubt when the Juventus midfielder was enduring a poor Serie A campaign, and Gilberto Silva (a surviving winner from 2002) is respected for his talismanic influence and calming authority in the dressing room. Both players were replaced by footballers who brought more to the side, even allowing for the fact that the shape was altered somewhat. Josué injected enough tenacity and energy (definitely not the forte of Gilberto Silva) but even positional awareness (so lacking in Felipe Melo) to the holding role that it almost seems redundant by comparison to field two battlers to do the job of one.

But Dunga has insisted that Felipe Melo and Gilberto will be startes with him, ceterus paribus, come Brazil's opener versus North Korea next Tuesday 15th.

Will these adjustments have come too late for Dunga, politically and logistically, to solidify them to the detriment of his tried and trusted formula?

* = thanks to Daniel for rectifying the score.

Dunga's List

2010-05-15T21:37:00.001-03:00

So now that Carlos Caetano Bledorn Verri has announced his 23-man list of players for the World Cup (definitive pending last-minute injuries, with seven named outsiders remaining on standby), the popular reactions in Brazil are not so different from those expressed by people all the world over in recent days; give or take the tenuating influence of a plainly sincere patriotism and huge (some would say unhealthily) emotional investment of Brazilians in the implications of this simple sporting decision.

Patently aware that such debates are liable to fall into Manichaean simplicity, I eagerly consumed Dunga's press conference itself and the reaction, at state, nationwide and international level in the hope to capture a balanced appraisal of views.

The press conference itself was a far from the sipid, sanitised affair I had come to expect through the weariness of having listened to Sven Goran Erikson soundbites down throught the years. Instead, as a local gaucho journalist pointed out, it was a lesson in PR delivery under pressure; the glare of a nation's scrutiny which Dunga had to bare for just over an hour, alongside assistant coach Jorginho. The duo delivered their message resolutely, at times with a soft hand, firm convictions couched in diplomatic language but occassionally the tension threatened to boil over, and almost got the better of a simmering Jorginho.

Let's go through the team, position by position and see how the inclusions
and ommissions have been received in the court of public opinion.

In goal. Unanimous approval of Julio Cesar, widely considered the world's best keeper. Gomes of Tottenham was a late runner but it had largely been forgotten that he had played under Parreira in 2005, and Dunga's call-up represents a reward for recent performances at a high level. Much more contentious has been the sustained inclusion of Doni of AS Roma ahead of Gremio's Victor as a reserve, despite recently being injured and despite never having even played minutes under Dunga. For the coach, the issue was one of reciprocal loyalty and compromise; Doni had triggered a row with his Italian employers and been reprimanded for insisting on staying with the national team and undergoing restorative treatment under the 'canarinha' physio Fábio Masseredjan. And the opportunity was not wasted by Dunga, who was at pains to use this an instructive gesture towards his other squad members. It also conveniently provided him with ammunition to highlight the wayward attitude of players, such as Ronaldinho Gaucho, who had requested holidays during the 2007 Copa America.

The squad list as a whole is basically the 2009 Confederations Cup team in its entirety, which itself was the culmination of three years' solid work. It also serves as a boiler plate statement for Dunga's raison d'etre; with us or against us, we're all in this together, love us or hate us, we don't care. Now, even the most disheartened critics have had to concede to Dunga the valid point that to turn around at the last moment, to abandon his convictions and cede to popular and media-led demand by including such and such a player would have been a betrayal of his project, and perhaps have risked his hard-won authority in the eyes of his existing recruits. This last word here is apt in its military connotations because Dunga used the podium to evoke, not so convincingly, turbulent periods of Brazilian history, going so far as to appeal to the Brazilian's capacity to withstand suffering given that "we Brazilians are all, to some degree, descended from slaves", patent nonsense that overlooks how large swathes of the crypto-feudal governing elite, especially in the northernmost regions, and who blight the country with their dubious practices are commonly descended from white slave owners! Such allegories were immediately called out and refuted by esteemed journalists such as Juca Kfouri, who went on to denounce the thub-thumping patriotism as "the refuge of scoundrels" in allusion to George Bernard Shaw's famous quote.

The most vexing issue for the Brazilian public has been the ommission of creative starlets Paulo Henqrique 'Ganso' (20) and Neymar (18), both of Santos C.F., given the absence of ingenuity that would likely befall team in the event of Kaka's protagonism being deleted or hampered by his recurring pubis injury. Julio Baptista, for all his endeavours and goal-scoring ability is not considered to be a player gifted enough to fill the potential void in the absence of the Real Madrid man. Moreover, Ganso offers something different to even those undeniably supreme qualities offered by Kaka; in place of the power, verticality and shooting of the latter (a very direct and 'objective' trequartista by most standards), young Ganso ('Goose')exudes a more svelt and and pensive style, a classical 'enganche' it would be fair to say with hints of the grace of a young Riquelme (and so far without the cocooned fecklessness of the Slow-Motion Wizard). That, of course, is a strictly technical appraisal of what Ganso (or a similar player) could offer to Brazil, even as an option on the bench, to unlock well-organised defenses in a way that contrasts to Dunga's set-piece bombardment strategy.

The more emotive element to this is of course, that curious and untangible sensation generated amongst all and sundry through the introduction of young prodigies as a potential wild card, and unknown element to throw on and upset veteran opponents who have never faced them before, and secondarily to hone talent for the future tournaments such as 2014, towards which the selection of these tyros might provide a grounding experience. If these arguments even vaguely smack of wishful thinking, then Dunga is only too happy to adopt the according posture; "I'm not preparing young players for 2014- I've been hired to win the 2010 World Cup!" he affirms. Not my job guv', appears to be the stock reply.

Another sentimental aspect, and one which is perfectly understandable, is the Brazilian public's desire to see some home-based players represented in the squad.
Consider the following: in 1958 all of Brazil's World Cup winners were domestically based. In 1970 the same could be said. 1982 witnessed Brazil take all but two domestic-based players to the finals; creative midfielder Dirceu and also a 28-year Falcão at the time playing for Roma. This should be instructive; both players had moved to Europe just when they were entering their prime and not as adolescent hopefuls as is so often the case today. That a Flamengo side that featured Zico and Junior at their zenith beat Liverpool convincingly in the 1981 Intercontinental Cup was as much indicative of the strength of the Brazilian Championship back then as it was of the lack of interest and respect paid by some of the Liverpool players such as Graeme Souness, who admitted that he among others had approached the outing as welcome respite and an opportunity to play some golf.

If you will kindly indulge a further aside, a word about Falcão: his ommission from the 1978 tournament has to be classified as ludicrous when taking into consideration that he was captain of an Internacional side who had won consecutive league titles in 1975 and '76, and would add a third in 1979. Unlike Falcão, there is no single player in today's Brazilian league whose case on cold hard merit and achievement screams for admission.

In 1986, a similar story in terms of squad composition; 31-year old centre-back Edinho of Udinese along with Junior (ex-Flamengo and flying full-back from '82) who was now at Torino. Italia '90 saw a substantial exterior make-up to the squad with up to ten players (primarily Italy-based; the imposing clout of Serie A in Europe) making the squad, but by 1994 a watershed had been reached; twelve overseas-based Brazilian players, for the first time constituting a majority, in a squad of twenty-two. This proportion remained basically the same in 1994 with eleven out of twenty-two, but by 1998 this home representation had dropped dramatically to just six players in a Eurocentric footballing world.

Luiz Felipe Scolari's formula of Faith and Fatherland was a major factor in upsetting the trend in 2002 when in a moment of lucidity or tokenism he included thirteen footballers who had yet resisted the allure of Euro, sterling, yen and petrodinars. But that Kleberson would go on to be one of the stars of that team is telling: whilst winning the Brazilian title with unfancied outfit Atletico Paranaense in December 2001 surely stands as a worthy achievement, it is difficult to dispute that at this rate, the general quality of Brazil's championship was far behind those of the European leagues where its exports were shining; and this was true even in the years before the recent strenghtening of the Brazilian currency, the Real, and the subsequent repatriation of high-profile players who are not completely finished.

In 2006, only three players were selected for Carlos Alberto Parreira's deflating adventure in Germany; Kleberson, by then finding his feet back in Brazil following a frustrating spell with Manchester United, was not deemed sufficiently good to warrant a call-up. This time around however, the same player is back on board for South Africa, and this time not even overtures to national pride are cutting little ice with that constituency of Brazilian fans who would otherwise welcome his inclusion. Kleberson, in recent weeks, has been ushered towards the fringes of a dysfunctioning Flamengo squad, and when he did make an appearance recently in the Libertadores quarter-final versus Chilean side "La U", he was anonymous.

Though they compete for different positions, the juxtaposition has been eagerly seized upon by the public between that of Kleberson's ineffectiveness and a different, startling performance, also held on the same night, by Ganso as his Santos side lost away to Gremio in a 4-3 thriller. "Dunga, are you watching!" was the incredulous cry of an exasperated Brazilian audience. The "Goose" is so named because of his deceptively awkward gait, rotund-like waist and thin limbs, not to mention a beak-shaped face (unless my eyes deceive me), but his football is anything but clumsy. He set up Santos' second goal, came close to adding one of his own with a seemingly impossible lob from about 10 yards only to clip the crossbar, was constantly threading balls through a decent Grêmio defense (featuring the impressive Mário Fernandes - a proto-Puyol in the making) for centre-forward André, and then capped it all off with a lofted diagonal ball onto the chest of Robinho who volleyed home for Santos' crucial third and a lifeline for the return leg.

Mention of Santos, inevitably, cannot exclude talk of Neymar, the wirey jitterbug of a second-striker-cum-winger (not unlike Robinho) and of his exclusion from Brazil's 23-man squad. Dunga's refusal to bow to pressure on this front made a pointed reference to how, despite the stellar rise in form of Santos over the past six months, this has amounted to winning the São Paulo State Championship against many a provincial side, whereas in their most recent baptism of fire - playing for Brazil at U-20 level - neither of the Santos kids were impressive, hence his doubts about their ability, at the moment, to make a step up to such an elite level.

My own view on the pair is that Ganso is the more worthy of inclusion, not so much because of a perceived superiority/inferiority with regards Neymar in absolute terms, but because in the case of the Goose, his game is such that it is more collective-minded, team-oriented; he is a playmaker after all, and therefore more conducive to complementing his senior teammates were he to make any appearances, however brief. Neymar is pure excitement, irreverance, a dribbler with a spontaneity that could prove useful in the future if allied with a greater awareness of those around him.

Thus the ground was laid for some of the most jagged questions, dare say accusations, hurled at Dunga during the press conferece. Each query was a variation on this theme, the Santos kids, and each was couched in language ranging from respectful to insistent to denunciatory; in the latter case, journalist Cicero Mello pulled no punches when he expounded: "Dunga, I thank God you were not national team coach back in 1958, 'cos on this basis you wouldn't have taken Pele to that World Cup". Dunga's response was measured, but his assistant Jorginho decried such comparisons between Neymar and Pele as absurd. A visibly flustered Jorginho leapt to his former team mate's defence when another question from the floor pryed as to whether Dunga was waging and ideological vendetta on talent since his 1994 group of victors were, on the whole, not noticeably talented, and also as to whether Dunga (and players of his ilk) were incapable of recognising or appreciating talent. It is hard to imagine someone addressing Fabio Cappello in such terms at Soho Square!

Right now, Robinho provides an individualist wild-card for Dunga, so there seems to be less of a case for bringing someone of similar characteristics and besides, Nilmar is a reliable back-up for the Manchester City misfit in the outside-left slot, offering directness, speed and goalscoring ability. Of Ganso's type, there is no other, young or old in this Brazil squad, and on that basis alone, I think it would be worth taking a risk on him.

Other approving noises were made by the technical staff in honour of those players who had proved their versatility at both international and club level in recent years. Players like Daniel Alves were heralded for their willingness to "play anywhere you want me to, Professor, as long as it's not in goal", and now the Barcelona wing-back is Dunga's most adaptable weapon, Player No.12, with a view towards claiming right-back (behind Maicon), right-interior-midfield and even left-back in the event of any adjustments. Michel Bastos looks to have claimed the left-back slot, somewhat belatedly, but doubts remain concerning his positional awareness (raised by the press pack). Jorginho refuted this by pointing out that, in having played for Lille and then Lyon mostly as a wide-left midfielder and more recently as a right-sided tornante, people shouldn't view this as something detractory or undermining but rather see it as a chance to exploit other qualities gained through such versatility. But Jorginho then went on to extend the rebuttal into an urbi-et-orbi appeal, a plea even, for people to stop being so negative about everything, why can't you see the positive....get behind us: overall it conveyed self-pity, a dose of moralism, and arguably bordered on emotional blackmail.

In terms of sriking options, there is plain confidence in Luis Fabiano's credentials but those of his back-up, Grafite, are being questioned. Do bear in mind that Wolfsburg, despite being 2008-09 German champions enjoy a very low profile in Brazil, where perhaps only Bayern Munich register on the consciousness. Grafite is seen as emblematic of a typical Dunga inclusion; rewarded for hard work, the former door-to-door bin-bag salesman has quietly but seriously gone about shaping a career for himself in Europe. Alas, this absence of a star name or a more glamourous team only generates a mistrust in his compatriots, who fear, however injustly, that he may be simply another Afonso Alves.

Dunga will doubtelssly take delight in confounding those pundits an ex-players who take a view of the game that he would consider absurdly romantic, naive and even effete and decadent. To be fair, the fatuous Nike-isation of Brazil's footballing image in recent years has done much to support his argument against ball-juggling, irresponsible street entertainers. In return this has only ilicited a firey reaction from the more 'macho, football-as-war' segments of the footballing public in direct proportion to such frivolity. But both views are mistaken, in my opinion. The strength of Brazilian football as demonstrated 1958, 1970 and 1982 was the ability to play convincing, pro-active football, garnished with individual virtuosity and fused with a sense of synchronisation and tactical solidity; this is the country, after all, which orginated the back-four system.

Mauricio Macri, the current mayor of Buenos Aires and former Boca Juniors president, once attempted to explain traditionalist Argentine misgivings about then albiceleste boss Marcelo Bielsa, whose side were garnering plaudits for their adventurous Dutch-inspired attacking play between 1999 and 2002: "He has mechanised football", proffered Macri. In other words, for many Argentines, whether of the cynical (Bilardista) or noble (Menotti)persuasion in their footballing tastes, Bielsa's Argentina played too fast and too intensely, with little room for improvisation. The caveat is that Bielsa's machine was geared completely towards offensive, adventurous football. Dunga, in contrast, has mechanised the Brazilian team towards a different operating system; a coiled spring, a pressing machine which contracts and then lunges in rapid and objective counter-attacks. It is so compact, that the midfield has practically ceased to exist as a component.

One thing has become clear to me is that Dunga displays the materials necessary to be a club coach. The consistency of his work since taking command in August 2006 bears the hallmark of an authority that usually can only be wielded on a day-to-day basis at club level. There is talk of more than one Italian Serie A suitor, but even a World Cup triumph will not satiate a large swathe of the Brazilian people.

Notice: Hiatus

2010-01-31T12:28:00.001-02:00

Folks,
I will be away from the blog for the next two weeks as I am travelling. I will endeavour, however, to respond to any posts or queries you might care to leave while I am away, or to those recent ones that might have sneaked under my radar. Until then, I wish you all the best and look forward to resuming our dialogue.

Regards,

Roberticus

Brazilian national team update

2010-01-18T01:08:00.000-02:00

World Cup Countdown: Brazil update

Not far back, when October loomed and Brazil went about wrapping up their World Cup qualifying campaign, I was just one of many voices praising Dunga’s man management and, whatever reservations I had as to the team’s shape and tactics, it was self-evident that the canarinha were reaping the benefits of having a settled squad in which all but fringe places were decided. Few, if any, of the major national teams who seriously covet gold in South Africa can lay such a claim. Indeed, some struggled to qualify whilst others still have been churning through a dizzying turnover of players or resting their hopes on the return to fitness of talismanic figures. Not so Brazil.
Come the New Year and this generally still holds true; albeit the next few months will not be without concern for the Brazilian coaching staff as club form and injuries start to impede on even the most well-laid of plans.
If modern football is said to be a 14-man game, acknowledging the importance of key substitutions, it appears that Dunga’s favoured starting line-up is the following, a. Julio Cesar in goal; Lucio and Juan the centre-back pairing with Maicon usually getting the nod at right back ahead of Daniel Alves , who serves as Dunga’s wild card in a variety of positions; screening just ahead of them are Gilberto Silva and Felipe Melo with the close cooperation of a third body in there, either Elano , ( valued for his set-piece deliveries) or Ramires who brings all round dynamism to the mix; the attacking midfield slot is the preserve of Kaká, whose understudy is that eternal Dunga confidante Julio Baptista; the wide-left attacking position is held by Robinho – another favourite of Dunga’s, with Nilmar of Villarreal offering the alternative; and the No.9 shirt goes to Luis Fabiano whose deputy is an Adriano who is at last showing some signs of consistency and mental happiness back in his homeland.
No doubt you will have noted the absence of a left-back in my above summary; this intentionally reflects Dunga’s own predicament on the matter. André Santos earned call-ups on the back of impressive performances for Corinthians, but he has since been finding it hard to settle into his new side Fenerbahce; going so far as to getting involved and punished in a sex orgy scandal. But even accounting for this off-field indiscretion, André can be thankful that persistent injury left a more obvious candidate, Fábio Aurelio, indisposed at critical stages over the past year, whilst Deportivo La Coruña’s Filipe Luis failed to translate his admirable club form to the international sphere during the sole opportunity conceded him. In fact, Dunga has even experimented with Daniel Alves there, which goes to show how ill-assured he is by the current batch of pretenders.
Another area which we had previously considered done and dusted was the options from attacking midfield. Kaka will doubtlessly be the occupant of the No.10 sector, but his patchy form for Madrid, and by extension the possibility of injury-however slight- may well hamper the one player who is truly indispensable in this set-up. Julio Baptista is clearly a step below in light of Kaka, and brings less obvious qualities to the position, but even he has been poor for Roma this season, often failing to make the starting XI. If Diego couldn’t impress Dunga during his impressive spells with Werder Bremen, his recent performances for Juventus should see him failing to make the cut; a sad thing in my opinion, but a reflection of reality nonetheless.
This is not unrelated to the doubts surrounding Robinho’s starting place. For the national team, he has been a fixed starter despite his abject participation in Manchester City’s past season and a half. Clearly, the thinking of the management is to boost his confidence whilst his club career reaches some level of stability, and indeed the player has reciprocated the fraternal embrace of the national team- surely a relief for the man coming from Eastlands –with performances and application which have been more than acceptable. But surely Dunga cannot have been hoping that Robinho’s awol status at City would be such a protracted affair- and this becomes alarming coming into the final stretch before the World Cup begins. Hence, the entry in the past few games of Nilmar, who has responded with lively appearances and goals, is a godsend. Initially, Nilmar had been expected to slug it out in the pecking order for the No.0 shirt behind Luis Fabiano, Adriano and Pato. But the Milan forward has oddly, given his form for the rossoneri, been pushed to the margins and the demands for the position now in the coaches’ eyes appear to correspond to burly target men.
And now a distinct possibility is the return of Ronaldinho should his resurrection for Milan be sustained. But whereas before, Dinho was part of an attacking midfield duo alongside Kaka or else as a replacement for him, now there is the tantalizing prospect- however remote- that the gaucho will be considered for the outside-left position, a familiar brief to him from his Barcelona days and now his improving level at Milan.
Fringe players include centre-back Miranda of Sao Paulo and Wolfsburg’s Josué who usually comes in to replace one of the defensive midfielders. This is a sector which should cause Brazil a headache should Felipe Melo’s bleak period at Juventus continue, yet Dunga has leaped to the defence of the bianconero misfit saying that with Melo, Brazil have never lost a competitive game. And, of course, it has become customary for the national team to leave two or three peripheral places up for grabs amongst those Brazilian championship players who steal the headlines; this season’s beneficiaries have been Diego Souza (offensive mid- Palmeiras) and Diego Tardelli (striker for Atletico Mineiro). These places, however, are subject to form and fitness during the protracted state championships (from February until April) whilst the national league only gets underway in May.
By and large, we are likely to see the same collection of players in South Africa come June, though don’t be surprised if two key positions become a burning uncertainty.

UEFA Training Ground: Pellegrini's winning formation

2010-01-07T12:29:00.000-02:00

Following on from a previous post about Manuel Pellegrini's Madrid, I came across the following video which features the Chilean coach.

It is a brief 'UEFA Training Ground' interview with the coach in which he outlines his basic philosophy and preferred formations. As I suspected, the interview reinforces Pellegrini's predilection for a 4-2-2-2 formation, which I analysed in the previous post.

Do check it out:

http://www.uefa.com/trainingground/index.html#34002/512/940136

3-5-2 in provincial Brazilian football: same as 4-2-2-2?

2009-12-10T10:37:00.000-02:00

A few weeks ago, I attended a penultimate match in the Brazilian Serie B. A local side, Juventude, needed to win in order to assure themselves of avoiding relegation- an ignomony for a club that just ten years ago had won the state championship and the Brazilian cup. The visitors were Atletico Goianense, a club that had only come into existence nine years ago, but which through sound administration had managed to scale the divisions. The match finished 1-3 in Atletico's favour; deserved winners who displayed some fluency with the ball and as a local Juventudista remarked: "take three touches and they arrive in our area...". Juventude by contrast, were insipid. No heart and no ideas. To the fans, I'm sure the despondent effort or lack thereof was indignating, but it is the latter fact which discomforted me most, and I felt it was due an analysis: no ideas. Poor structure. Tactically awful. And a microcosm of a trend which has engulfed Brazilian football in recent years.

For one of Juventude's players, it will probably have been his last appearance at the Alfredo Jaconi stadium. Zezinho is a talented 17-year old who will soon sign for Arsenal. He attended a trial at London Colney a few months back, where Wenger, Liam Brady and the coaching staff assessed him. The lad's natural talent shone through, by all accounts, but they sent him back home with a list of things to improve on. Physically, Zezinho is short and slight, and so will have to bulk up before making the move. He will also need to improve his fitness in order to display more movement on European pitches where stationary playmakers are increasingly a rarity; in Brazil, attacking midfielders and strikers are virtually excused from defensive duties. Pressing barely exists, and this tendency increases the further one travels down the divisions. This in itself explains much about the pros and cons of domestic Brazilian football in its present state.

On the positive side, the lack of pressing strategy lends Brazilian games to being more open affair than elsewhere. Players have more time on the ball, and as such one tends to see a lot more dribbling from the offensive midfielders (meias) and forwards (atacantes). Now this is not an indictment of the ability of the defenders; far from it. The tackles go in as hard if not harder than in the Premier League, for instance. These are not weak players. Brazilian athletes are formidable. But what happens as a result is that defensive phase becomes scene to a series of individual duals, which in itself can be quite relishing to watch: the centre-back tries to dispossess the striker with acres of space and a vulnerable goal behind him- and the execution can often be exquisite. In a sense, this offers a snapshot of where, say Italian football was in the 1980s, albeit with a slightly more open and frenetic style. In a post-Sacchi world, European football is characterised by pressing tactics, zonal defending and the ball as a reference instead of the man as is the case in Brazil.

What this means is that the forwards are marked by the defenders, the advanced midfielders by the defensive mids and so forth. All of which is perfectly logical, but which also leads to another outcome: the increasing physicality and athleticism of the modern game entails more defensive work to be done. In Brazil, instead of distributing the ownice of this defensive responsibility throughout the team, in all lines, across all positions, the weight falls disproportionately on the defensive midfielders (volantes) who, as a result, have become almost exclusively destroyers.

Coaches and pundits here speak of '1st volante' and '2nd volante', and one could be forgiven for thinking that this implies that one player is more offensive/creative than the other (as per the Mascherano-Alonso partnership, for instance) but this is illusory. In reality, the first volante is a defensive player who slots into vacant spaces in the back line- typcially between the centre-backs. The second volante has two functions: he is usually a less astute player and as such rushes into the tackle ahead of his '1st' counterpart, and into the face of onrushing opponents. His other function is important for us to consider, as it is indicative of a seperate tactical development of Brazilian football; this defensive midfielder moves out wide to cover the space vacated by either full-back.

At this juncture, we should look at how such full-backs and defensive midfielders are co-dependent. The 'attacking Brazilian full-back' has almost become a cliche, especially in European eyes, where for decades our counterparts were less inclined to storm forward. But one of the great myths that has grown up around this topic, is that since 1958 Brazilian sides have always tasked both full-backs with advancing simultaneously. True, this has become a feature of Brazilian teams during the past two decades, and hence it explains their preoccupation with assigning a midfielder to shore up that flank which is most left vulnerable. In a way, this does a disservice to one of the great contributions of Brazil to world football, arguably the greatest, most enduring and widespread of any country; the back four, whose mechanism operated thus: One full-back advanced, the other one tucked in and the centre-backs shifted across.

Even accounting for the importance of attacking full-backs - a valuable weapon in any side's inventory, the tradtional 'chain'mechanism of the back four need not be discarded, provided that at least one of the full-backs is defensively sound. Look at how Guus Hiddink made one simple adjustment to override the shortcomings in previous Chelsea coach Scolari's plan. He istructed full-backs Bosingwa and Ashley Cole to simply alternate their forays forward, an instruction which Carlo Ancelotti has continued. As a result, Chelsea have been able to field an extra attacker safe in the knowledge that there is plenty of defensive cover further back.

So how come this mechanism has been all but discarded in Brazil? Well, both full-backs are obliged to move forward in teams that lack any attacking width, as is the case in the 4-2-2-2 paradigm of Brazilan football. With wingers, and even wide-midfielders, discarded as an option, both flanks demand that the full-backs advance- and in the case where both move forward at the same time, the defensive midfielders are obliged to take up the slack. It really is a chicken-and-egg connundrum: 1) the absence of creative holding midfielders leaves the team dependent on the full-backs as an outlet for rapidly bringing the ball out from defence, 2) The offensive brief of said full-backs necessitates that the covering midfielders be overtly defensive. And thus a vicious circle ensues.

A further limitation of this approach lies in how the very thing that once appeared to give the Brazilians such an advantage has effectively been nullifed by developments elsewhere; the rediscovery of wingers by European teams. Not that there were not footballing schools who kept the flame and persisted in fielding outside- forwards since the dawn of the 1980s (the Dutch, FC Barcelona, Zdenek Zeman's teams among them). But in top leagues all around the world, most teams appeared to consider true wingers a luxury in an increasingly defensive football. Two forwards were the maximum that a coach could afford to not have working behind the ball. But the renaissance of outside-forwards, built on the proviso that said players work behind the ball in defensive phase, renders the laneways once patrolled by the attacking full-back a more dangerous place to inhabit. What team would now dare to advance both full-backs simultaneously, or field two positionally suspect full-backs against a competitive side playing a 4-3-3? And risk being overwhelmed by a 2 vs 3 situation at the back? No thanks.

Now to relate all this to Juventude and the Brazilian Serie B, how is it relevant. Well, both Ju and their adversaries Atletico lined up in essentially the same format. With a little variation, here and there, but basically it was the same structure. Juventude played a 3-4-2-1 and Atletico a typical 4-2-2-2 (with two destroyers). I wasn't that impressed by Atletico tactically speaking, I simply felt that their players were better overall than the locals, and unsurprsingly they won promotion to Serie A that very day. A comparative team from a different football culture, operating in a similar division and with similar resources could yet have made a better fist of dismantling the Atletico attacks, attacks which appeared controlled and expansive in light of the shambolic organisation they were up against. This has recently been demonstrated in South American tournaments where club sides from Ecuador, Uruguay and Paraguay are increasingly inclined to defend zonally when up against top Brazilian teams, and punch above their weight, considering that Brazilian domestic wages and the pool of talent are more generous than in other leagues on the continent.

I recall thinking how I would have taken that same starting XI, those very same players, and simply adjusted their positioning and with a few simple instructions (surely not that arduous to rehearse on the training ground a few days prior to the match), and even though it still would have been less than ideal (I couldn't for the life of me fathom the fielding of two destroyers - a waste of personel and positioning), you still would end up with something more coherent, perhaps a 4-3-1-2 or even a 4-3-2-1 albeit with a less plodding midfield (by moving one of the defensive midfielders back to full-back in a four, and asking one of the wing-backs to tuck in closer to a midfield trio).

Juventude simply could string a series of passes together. Despite playing with two destroyers in front of three centre-backs, they appeared disjointed everytime their opponents venture into the final third. Countless attempts to change the direction of the play broke down, since the defensive midfielders were slow-thinking and their attempts at raking long diagonal passes out to the wing-backs went wide of the mark. It resulted in a familiar, dispiriting scenario: the offensive midfielder Lopes found himself obliged to drift deeper onto the toes of his own volantes in order to bring calm and initiate some semblence of imaginative passing. Which led one to think: why are two or even three men doing the job of one? Until Association Football permits the fielding of 12 starting players, I see little point in this burocratisation of the midfield.

Regardless of formation, no top team should need more than one purely defensive midfielder; and quite a few even manage without. That is not to say that holding midfielders should be discarded. Absolutely not. The classical central midfielder (centre-half) was a holding player, albeit an organising figure, who rarely broke beyond the ball and who needed to have a panorama of the play unfolding ahead of him. He was the epicentre of the team, the focal point, a positional reference without which it would implode. The Argentines continue to say to this day, 'show me your holding midfielder and I'll tell you what kind of team you've got'. Now it's one thing to detail your No.5 with a defensive player for added security (hence the double pivot in the Spanish 4-2-3-1), arguably even a necessity. But why go so far as to abolish the organiser, and subsitute him with two defensive midfielders?

Inevitably, and sadly I might add, this brings me to the Brazilian national team where Dunga is content to abolish the midfield; for him it is a pesky nuisance, a liability where any elaboration on the ball will yield the loss of possession and a counter-attack for the opponents. Ignore for a moment the visceral thrill of a Kaka and Maicon led counter-attack. Discard if you will, the admitted brilliance of those immaculately rehearsed set-pieces which unfailingly result in Luis Fabiano's goal-bound headers. No where within this philosophy does Dunga pause to think of the paradox at the heart of it; that such a destructive midfield endagers his defensive security- through sloppy and lethargic passing which puts his team under pressure. Well-drilled opponents who agressively press Gilberto Silva and Felipe Melo will invariably draw mistakes from them.

Two years ago, Tim Vickery, the Brazil-based British journalist argued that it would be a good thing for Brazilian football and football in general were Brazil to lose the Copa America final to an Argentina side who valued elaborative and patient passing. His reason, argued Vickery, was that an Argentine victory would impose a temporary freeze on the tendency towards ever-greater athleticism in football, given that winning sides tend to be imitated throughout football's food chain. Sadly for such aesthetes, it was not to be and Dunga's muscular side simply overpowered the Argentines. Even ignoring the subjectivity of such an opinion, horses for courses and all that, Vickery's desire may well be incarnated in reality over the coming years. Indeed, reality as opposed to aesthetics may dictate that Brazilian football's crippling addiction to the "two-destroyers-plus-two-wing-backs" format becomes finally exposed and undone to the national team's expense at a major tournament. And such a watershed may come at the hands of an opponent less self-consciously retro-romantic and diffident than Alfio Basile's 2007 Argentine vintage, but an opponent nonetheless committed to fluency and coherence in central midfield, virtues which Brazilian football seems to have discarded for the past two decades.

Carlos Alberto Parreira argued back in 1994 that his "two-destroyers-plus-two-wing-backs" formula was a necessary evil since he felt obliged by the suffocating pressure of Brazil not having won the World Cup in twenty-four years. Now Parreira is an engaging, worldly and personable figure- one of the more likeable of the prolific coaches in world football and having been raised a Fluminense supporter, the team of Rio de Janeiro's privileged classes, he had an appreciation of aesthetically pleasing football and little time for reactionary posing by many of his successors. Since 1994, Brazil have gone on to repeat their international success; at 2002 in the World Cup and in the 1999, 2004 and 2007 Copa America editions. Consequently, there is no proverbial drought to end. No justifications whatsoever for any assumed inferiority complex when placed alongside the Europeans, whose sports science and fitness levels the Brazilians have matched and arguably even overtaken. But there is the danger that Brazilian football will be schooled in arts that it once gave to the world, and which they might be well advised to go about reviving.

Fernando Calazans once said of this marked tendency towards midfield tussles and disjointed passing thus: " We have foolishly surrendered our arms, handed them over and taken up the weapons of our opponents' choosing".

What he might have added was that the opponents (the Europeans) have taken up those very weapons that Brazil once discarded, refined them and adapted them to the modern era, whilst offloading such outmoded practices as man-marking onto the Brazilians.

You never know a good until you've let it go.

Pellegrini's options

2009-09-18T00:23:00.000-03:00

"No juego con mediapuntas* porque no sé bien qué hacen" ('I don't play with advanced playmakers* because I don't know what exactly it is that they do') afirms Manuel Pellegrini.

Below: Pellegrini's 4-2-2-2 lending itself to assymetry as per the characteristics of the players.

The Chilean 'Engineer' outlines a key component of his footballing philosophy, explaining his predeliction for a system which starts from 4-2-2-2, and becomes 4-2-3-1 or 4-4-1-1 in defensive phase, depending on the characteristics of the opposing players. However, beyond its immediate implications for Madrid, I thought it opportune to examine the broader conclusions to be drawn from Pellegrini's blueprint, and how such systems can operate, first in the abstract and then in specific application by other teams.

First let us look at Pellegrini's idealised state of football, or something like that, starting with his Villarreal sides as a base; we can assume that the fruits of four years at the helm of the 'Yellow Submarine' club more fully embodied his vision than does at present a Madrid team very much in the incubator stage.

Pellegrini instructed his full-backs to alternate their incorporations to the attack. Ahead of the four-man defense was a duo of holding midfielders but each of constrasting styles; normally one was a pure destroyer (Sebastian Eguren or Alessio Tacchinardi), whilst the other was a robust organising figure (Marcos Senna). One of the pair was detailed to plug defensive gaps when a full-back would advance whilst the other would advance slightly in support of the play ahead of him, but rarely breaking beyond the ball. Two creative players started from a comparatively advanced position on both flanks, often interchanging their respective positions. Hence their attacking movement was as much horizontal as it was diagonal and less so vertical, which distinguished this midfield from that of a classic flat 4-4-2.

It is in this band that we find the most curious detail of the system and one of great concern to those footballers purporting to be 'mediapuntas', to whom Pellegrini refers in the above quote. The team line-up was typically capped off by two strikers, or at least two forwards of some description. One was usually an orthodox fixed central presence, such as the multi-faceted Diego Forlan or the more recognisably target-men Guille Franco/Joseba Llorente. The other tended to be a more elusive, mobile attacker (such as Nihat or later Guiseppe Rossi).

Pellegrini did often face away games in Europe with the presence of a third attacking-midfielder centrally placed to the detriment of the support striker, effectively an enganche/mediapunta in all but name. But this was clearly a plan B borne out of defensive considerations ; not that 4-2-3-1 always need be considered defensive, but in this case it was a slight gesture to caution from Pellegrini who wanted his team to retain posession for even longer periods in European fixtures. Generally speaking, nonetheless, a player like Ariel Ibagaza who was a nimble incarnation of the classic Argentine enganche or even Spain's Santi Cazorla- a player of similar characteristics- usually found himself required to play from a wider position under Pellegrini's 4-2-2-2.

Pellegrini's problems at Madrid can be summarised thus:

-club sold Snejider, ideal player for the 'interior' positions in his 4-2-2-2

Above: how Pellegrini's sides triangulate to create width in a 4-2-2-2

- Cristiano Ronaldo is ideally suited to the outside-forward positions in a 4-3-3, a no-go for Pellegrini who prefers fluctuating width. Failing that, then as either a second-striker in a front pairing or as a very direct No.10 behind the strikers in a 4-3-1-2;trouble is, this role is also ideally suited to Kaka.

- Kaka himself thrives on the aforementioned 'mediapunta role', so how to divvy up one role and one position between two explosive, powerful players, each lethal at striding into the box or shooting from beyond it. Ergo, danger of a redundancy of roles, players making similar runs, getting in each others' way etc.

- Kaka can also play as a second-striker to a partner (as he frequently did in away games for Milan)in a front two. But in Raul, Benzema and Higuain, Madrid already have overbooking in this department.

- As indicated from the opening paragraph to this post, Pellegrini doesn't like to use that type of player commonly known as a mediapunta in Spain (half-forward), enganche in Argentina, meia de ligacao/quarto homem do meiocampo in Brazil, and trequartista in Italy. In English we don't have a specific equivalent (the use of the term 'second-striker' is erroneous since its proper usage refers to a slightly different role, namely that of the mobile attacker employed either side of and in support of the No.9, typically a reconverted winger or a versatile forward). Granted, some enganches have succesfully reconverted into second-strikers and vice-versa, so I'll attempt a coinage for English; 'advanced linkman' (a bit unwieldy, admittedly).

Consider the role of the traditional enganche, whether he be the languidly poetic type (as in Riquelme, Rui Costa or a young Andrea Pirlo) or else the more lively, mobile -and typically shorter- fellow (like Pablo Aimar, Diego Ribas de Cunha, Luka Modric); whether he be playing behind one striker (as in 4-2-3-1) or two (as in 4-3-1-2). It is indicative of the changes creeping across modern football that these players have had to either re-adjust their playing style or else fall into obsolesence, a fate which Rui Costa, if he were still playing, would surely have shared with Riquelme. Andrea Pirlo lit a beacon to the languid trequartista by devising his by-now legendary playing-behind-the-midfield role, but Pirlo's trailblazing inversion of the midfield diamond has inexplicably gone unheeded by like-minded artistes; witness Riquelme's obdurate refusal to compromise his game so much an inch, not even if what his coach proposes turns out to be his only hope of survival in the modern game. The more nimble exponents of No.10-craft have learnt to readjust to slightly deeper role (such as Deco in Barcelona's three-man midfield)or else to a nominally wide position just ahead of the midfield such as Modric in Spurs' assymetrical 4-4-2 (more naturally suitable still would be a wide creative role in a 4-2-3-1 for the purposes of cohesiveness, but the Croat's individual freedom is not curtailed due to said assymetry).
Pellegrini wishes, ideally, to have two such playmakers who can start from these wide positions yet without making for a flat 4-4-2 in the classical sense.

Some questions arise at this point:
- is this magic square essentially a 4-2-3-1 only without the trequartista in the middle and an extra striker of some description? Pellegrini has said that he considers Ronaldo to be a forward without specifying as to whether that might encompass No.9, second-striker or winger, which seems a fair observation given the various roles the Portuguese played at Manchester United. Ronaldo could also conceivably play as a No10 in a 4-2-3-1, and one that was set-up to be counter-attacking but there again, so too could Kaka, hence one of them would be forced wide in such an arrangement. Neither is especially suited to a patient playmaking role, least of all Ronaldo, and both prefer to surge into open space.

- how effective is the 4-2-2-2 when it comes to transitions and the defensive phase and how could Pellegrini's players be comfortably effective in executing such tasks?

- What defensive variant should the 4-2-2-2 morph into when in defensive phase (following the Capello dictum of nine men behind the ball)? How deep can the defensive formation be initiated without compromising the characteristics of certain players?

- if Cristiano and Kaka occupy the advanced midfield positions in this system, would it be more natural in defensive phase to revert to a 4-2-3-1 (one of the strikers dropping off to mark the opposing defensive midfielder) or would a Sacchian 4-4-2/4-4-1-1 not be too exerting and wasteful of their talents? In the 4-2-3-1, Cristiano and Kaka could initate their pressing from a relatively higher station and therefore closer to the oppoenents' goal than they would under two flat banks of four, which in the modern game is better suited to deep defending.

- Would Cristiano and Kaka plus the two strikers make this a 'broken team'( a front four and a back four being tenuously held together by two midfielders), therefore top-heavy like Brazil at the 2006 World Cup? Hence would it not be better for one of them to play as a second-striker, and the other to remain in an advanced midfield role (thereby offering opportunity for a more defensively solid player like Granero to take the remaining wide midfield spot)?

- One would imagine that such top-heaviness might be allayed by spreading the offensive ballast of the team more broadly over the pitch, namely in a 4-3-3 with Cristiano and Kaka as wide attackers, and without compromising the depth of the midfield. But this seems to be anathema to Pellegrini, who has tended to prefer a Wenger-esque 4-4-2 in his teams. Examples of other teams abound: Didier Deschamps' Monaco lit up the 2003-04 Champions' League with a similar approach. More pertinently, Madrid under Del Bosque played the 2000-01 season in a fluid 4-2-2-2.Del Bosque repeated the experiment with the Spanish national team's friendly versus England in February 2009, a game which saw Xabi Alonso and Marcos Senna holding the midfield behind Xavi and Iniesta. At Madrid, Pellegrini obviously counts on the deep organisation of Alonso but can also call on an even more destructive player (relative to Senna who is virtually a double of Alonso) in Lassana Diarra.

- Pellegrini argues against 4-3-3, reasoning that 'permanent width' could make his team too predictable and that in a 4-2-2-2 his players have more chance to occupy and vacate wide spaces at will during the build-up by engaging in a series of triangles horizontally across the pitch before playng the final killer pass. Against this rationale, one could argue that the permanent width that a 4-3-3 creates ceases to be so once the team arrive in the final third. But Pellegrini would argue that he prefers his team to have open pastures of space ahead of it, hence their preference to disoccupy it and hopefully draw their opponents further into the midfield. His teams are also less suited to pressuring high up the pitch, since Ronaldo and Kaka thrive when they have acres ahead of them for the counter-attack. One potential problem is that this can lead to overelaboration without ever penetrating the defence.

This Saturday (October 17th), fortune conspired through injuries and enforced rest for Pellegrini to be without Ronaldo and Kaka, and therefore in a position to use two players who would have thrived in his Villarreal sides; Van der Vaart and Granero. Both were ideally suited to the wide creative roles in his 4-2-2-2, since they don't need a lot of space ahead of them in order to carry the ball, preferring instead to offer quick distribution and defensive dilligence (in the case of Granero, who is more of an 'interior' in the modern Spanish sense of the word) and encyclopaedic passing and fantasy in the case of Van der Vaart, who is more recognisably a Modric-style No.10 and who like Modric, Deco et al, now needs to make the transition playing with more defensive responsibilities. This is all very well, but the reality is that sooner or later Kaka and Crisitano will return to the starting line-up.

My conclusion is that unless one of Ronaldo and Kaka volunteers to play as a second forward, Pellegrini cannot fit them both into a specifically 4-2-2-2 system, due to the 'broken team' scenario, and even then, the other wide creative role should go to a player like Granero who offers balance and positional discipline, whilst Kaka should be less restricted in his station. The overall effect would be to produce an assymetric system, best understood by looking at the graphic provided here. The disadvantage with such an intentionally assymetrical system is that the transition to defensive phase is harder to programme and automate in the players' movements

Accepting that both Ronaldo and Kaka are sacred cows, another system must be employed but one which includes a third midfielder (of some description) situated closer to the Alonso-Diarra double pivot, so that these two will not become overrun (eg; triangulated by the opposition) in defensive phase. More importantly, it offers Alonso another creative outlet in terms of distributing the ball from central areas, assuming that said player is not markedly destructive (which would rule out Mahamadou Diarra, for instance). Guti is conceivably an option but such a player would need to be defensively attentive and industrious during 90 minutes - a big ask of Guti, especially in games away from the Bernabeu.

Whichever way we choose to look at it, an integrally narrow three-man midfield is what we are proposing here. So now the question is, discarding the option of overt assymetry, which concrete formation(s) is/are most suitable for Madrid in terms of personnel? For me, it comes down to a choice between 4-3-3 and 4-3-1-2 as both systems can be built around an identical tight-three man midfield. My own preference would be for the first with Kaka and Ronaldo wide but Pellegrini clearly does not even consider this. So, it seems that the midfield diamond is the next most obvious option.

But how to configure the midfield? Lass is not a static player and, though more than capable of screening a defence a la Mascherano, his best version is seen when his energy and agression can be employed quicker in the tackle, interrupting the opponents' constructive play earlier in the transition. Alonso on the other hand is less mobile and therefore a liability for the wide-of-centre roles, since said role requires the player to track back and assist his full-back, amongst other demanding tasks. Granero can do this on one side but Alonso on the other? There is the argument that Alonso would be too lightweight and indeed too slow to act as the sole holder at the base of the midfield. But this can be counterweighted by either of Granero and Diarra tucking in beside him during certain phases of play.

Fortuitously enough, such an arrangement may be be born out of necessity to cover the positional fleet-footedness of attacking left-back Marcelo: Lass being a constant defensive presence nearby. This scenario would also see some natural balance on the other flank, only in this instance it would be an inverse of the left side since Granero- a considerably less defensive player than Lass, would be less burdened than his French teammate given a more defensively solid and conservative full-back in Alvaro Arbeloa positioned behind him. This may conceivably encourage assymetry should the players lose their bearings, and even invite teams to concentrate their attacks down whichever of Madrid's flanks is left unguarded, but such is Pellegrini's lot. It looks like no system will easily fit this Madrid, but the centrality of Granero to whatever embryonic scheme the coach may hatching is becoming increasingly conspicuous.

Brazil vs Chile in Salvador da Bahia: preview. September 9th, 2009

2009-09-09T14:51:00.000-03:00

With qualification secured, tonight's clash against visitors Chile could well have been approached as a rehearsal, or even a party piece, by a Brazilian squad. But with a few notable absentees through suspension, Dunga's team will be one which, while offering something of a novelty in the changes to the line-up, will hardly be entertaining frivolity nor indulging in experminents. The coach is decided; he and his players "know what they are playing at" to use a local expression- an allusion less to craftiness or guile than to an identity, a game plan, any game plan.

Besides their unbridled ambition to wrap up their three remaining games as group leaders, the willingness, dare I say, stubborness with which Brazil will stick to their itemised script will be reflected in the seriousness with which Kaka's, Robinho's, Lucio's and Luis Fabiano's replacements will take to the stage tonight, for theirs is a big audition. That Julio Baptista, Nilmar, Miranda and Adriano should appear desperately eager to book their place on the plane to South Africa whilst acknowledging that none among them will be a theoretical starter come next summer is testimony to Dunga's deft man-management.

Whatever misgivings as to the style on display, eulogies are being bandied about as to the group's motivation levels, professional attitude and lack of fanfare (insofar as this is possible with the seleção)- even the suffocatingly synchophantic and commercially-driven relations with the media, normally a source of constant irritation for even the most affable of Brazilian national team coaches - appears not to be denting the mood in and around the camp. The ostentatious demonstrations of spirituality televised and so etched onto the world's consciousness during recent tournaments- the "I Love Jesus" shirts, the huddled prayer offerings on bended knee, the gestures towards the heavens- all this has been further woven into the ethos of the dressing-room, but this time taking on a more intimate and ecumenical dimension.

Assistant Coach Jorginho counts among his fellow born-again brethern Kaka and Lucio, but the other Protestant denominations represented here and well as the more traditionally representative Catholics- devout, lapsed and ambiguous are also in on the act. Even those who are not entirely comfortable with expressing what, which or if any faith they adhere to in such an arena have been steadily accommodated in an atmosphere of mutual support and bonding. Even Robinho has shown signs of tempering his predeliction to party, or at least controlling his playboy urges when surrounded by this group of friends and players.

Out on the pitch, tonight, Brazil will be practically identical to the team which defeated Argentina in Rosario, at least in terms of shape. Like-for-like replacements seems to be Dugna's mantra and with the least structural change possible. So Miranda slots into to the space vacated by Lúcio in the back four, Julio Baptista resumes his understudy role for the absent Kaká in the advanced midfield position, the lightning-quick Nilmar will assume Robinho's second-striker-cum-false-winger role whilst Adriano is the logical stand-in for target man Luis Fabiano.

Brazilian punditocracy concludes that Dunga has fifteen squad places clearly accounted for (as in 'further applicants need not apply'), an additional four spots to be slugged out between a fixed list of some six contestants, as well as a list of (mainly domestically-based) local hopefuls who should be on standby in the event of late injuries or such set-backs, and finally, a vacancy for the secondary and tertiary goal-keeping positions. But it all looks pretty much decided: even the subsitutes have honed a serene awareness of the weight and hue of their respective contributions to the starting XI.

While for Dunga, at least, tactics shouldn't take on much prominence tonight, Chile will be hoping to add another tone to their cohesive set-up. Their eccentric and pensive coach Marcelo Bielsa will never let his side play a cautious game - home or away- Chile will take to the attack, perhaps even relentlessly, but he has given signs in recent outings of a certain willingness to compromise at least in terms of how his vertically challenged defenders deal with high-ball specialists, such are the Brazilians. Rather than compromise, call it attention to detail, for one thing that the obsessive Bielsa has never neglected has been the forensic element to the game, indeed, the Argentine native has been known to sleep in the facilities at Chile's training ground on occassion!

Bielsa has refined his Van Gaal-inspired 3-3-1-3 system in recent years since taking a sabbatical from football in 2004. His retiring to his farm in Santa Fe province should have served as some form of cold turkey, yet Bielsa simply concealed himself - in a manner reminiscent of Howard Hughes - in his library replete with football videos (he is purported to have some 3,000 odd performances on file), attempting to follow every detail of every development in world football. He did receive the odd visit to the ranch, do bear in mind, such as that by an aspirant Pep Guardiola (then still winding down his career in Mexico); the two spent eleven hours straight discussing minutae of the game.

Chile have switched between 4-3-3 and 3-3-1-3 throughout the qualifying phase, depending on the requirements, but for the Brazil clash the coach intends to slightly tilt the system towards a hybrid 4-2-3-1/4-2-2-2 for the extenuating circumstances of tonights game; namely, that few countries have as physically imposing a defensive base as Luizao and Miranda (who, after all, are back-up!) aided by Felipe Melo and Gilberto Silva, a bulwark against which the stocky and industrious little Humberto Suazo has struggled against in previous encounters. The aim tonight may simply be to draw the Brazilians out from their defensive midfield screen just that little bit further, thereby opening up spaces for the wide attackers -Alexis Sanchez and Jean Beausejour- to slip diagonally between the attack-minded Brazilian full-backs and the towering central players.

Independent of tonight's result, Chile should be on their way to South Africa. In the event of a hypthetical draw or victory, something not unimaginable, such a result should not be attributed to a lacsadaisacal approach on the part of the Brazilians. But teams, in their own different way, have a lot riding on tonight's performances, in what should make for a fascinating contest.

Inheriting the mantle: Luxemburgo and the Brazilian Tradition

2009-08-08T23:33:00.000-03:00

" That's the thing with these people who never put on a pair of football boots and never sang the national anthem out there on the pitch. Every coach has to be on the sidelines to sense the look on the players' faces, their expressions, their sweat..."

One suspects that Dunga’s sentiments as expressed above would be dismissed as bluster by an outsider such as Arrigo Saachi, who certainly needed no footballing pedigree when it came to successfully impressing his ideas upon professional players and compelling them with his leadership qualities. But even if Dunga's rebuke of the media owes some allowance to his being wounded by the severity of criticism leveled against him, and that his truism is not some iron law applicable across the spectrum, what weight then do the comments of outsiders truly hold? Have we nothing of value to contribute? Are we, at best, adjuncts to the real actors in the drama or, at worst, parasites with a self-inflated sense of importance?

One thing we can all be certain of our distance from the game; we can appreciate that the dressing-room door precludes us from a unique human drama which we will never be privy to. You guys talk a nice game, but we are the ones who have to live it. No wonder ex-players and coaches are such a corporative lot; they circle those wagons and close shop once external armchair criticism comes their way.

Except, maybe, when politics enters the equation. Witness the theatre of the absurd surrounding Fabio Capello's positioning of Steven Gerrard in England's friendly versus the Czech Republic in August 2008. Using the Setanta studio suite as a convenient pulpit, Harry Redknapp aimed an unfounded sermon decrying Capello's tactics for “killing” the Liverpool player. Former Manchester United full-back Paul Parker seconded Redknapp's criticisms but in doing so floundered on an ill-attempted stab at tactical acumen. Capello's perfectly coherent game plan that night, which the England boss articulated as a 4-3-2-1, allowed for Gerrard and Wayne Rooney to freely co-exist and mingle in the space between the England midfield and the lone striker in Heskey, with Gerrard asked to veer left in defensive phase and press the opposing right-back, and Rooney fulfilling a similar duty on the right to supplement the deeper midfield trio, but only when England were out of possession.

Now, given that Redknapp's portrayal of Capello's tactics were both wrong and misleading, we are left with two possible explanations: either the current Spurs boss is a poor reader of the game (in which case that leaves him on poor ground for assessing Capello's methods), or he was being disingenuous and thus employed the amplitude afforded him by the occasion to propagate one of the laziest old canards in fan culture, oft repeated believingly in pubs, living rooms and radio phone-in shows. But why would Harry need to launch such a broadside? Well, he has always had to conceal his umbrage at being overlooked for the England manager's job by Soho Square. When briefing those among his favourite journalists, he has expounded on all manner of elaborate tactical schemes by which he would hypothetically accommodate Joe Cole as a No.10 were he the gaffer. Conversely, in his public statements he has dismissed tactical considerations as bunkum, instead arguing with faux-common sense that such a collection of professional players just need a motivator-shouter to simply pick the right players and get them to gel together. As if it were all so simple.

But if Redknapp can muster the wherewithal to don the pundit's cap and shed his football manager's robes when political expedience requires, surely he is not the only coach to employ such cynical role swapping? These are the machinations which can see a football professional leave the confines of his guild to sit himself down amongst the critics of the external world, a world whose opinions on other occasions he is only too happy to delegitimise and dismiss. One prolific Brazilian coach who is content to play to both galleries is current Santos boss Wanderley Luxemburgo.

Tempting though it is to attribute Luxemburgo's omnipresence onscreen to keeping up appearances, warming the studio seat which he might occupy in the future or even just lubricating the mechanics of diplomacy between him and his fair weather media friends, the thing is, he actually seems to enjoy it, taking to it with great gusto, perhaps loving the sound of his own voice. Luxemburgo fancies himself as quite the footballing historian too, perhaps desiring to be cast as Eduardo Galeano cross-germinated with Johan Cruyff. More likely is that his vanity demands that he not only rule the roost with his teams within the four lines but that he also set the parameters for all footballing discussion beyond them.

But just like everything in and of Luxemburgo's persona, he doesn't quite pull it off; the Armani suit is ill-fitting. The rumours surrounding his tenure as Brazil national team coach, financial and personal, business and pleasure; there is no separation between the personal, the political and the public in the life of Luxe.

If most countries are anxious to shake off their stereotypical representations and thrust upon outsiders a richer and more nuanced canvass, then Brazil is in no hurry. Deep down, even the most ill-informed observer suspects that all is not samba, sun, sex and sandals, and that there is surely more to the country than this. But Luxemburgo's trajectory suggests a near parodical elision between two of the most cliched areas in Brazilian life: political skullduggery and football.

You see, the current Santos coach is presently making noises about running for the Brazilian senate. Therein, the two most obvious routes to success in Brazil; either join the kleptocracy which governs from the federal capital or become a footballer. Though equally obvious, both routes are markedly different in the difficulty entailed. Talent, though not solely, is undoubtedly the prime commodity required to make it as an athlete. To become a politician though, failing the reliable option of resorting to nepotism, one can always purchase a massive terrain of property in a distant, relatively uninhabited state, and one which you may never have previously set foot in. It is the eminently more sensible option than to open yet another branch of your Instituto Wanderley Luxemburgo, a franchise of sports professional formation faculties -cum- business self-empowerment course; imagine Tom Cruise's character in Magnolia being MC at Clairefontaine's French football academy with a smattering of start-up businessmen in the auditorium and you get the picture.

Only that Luxemburgo isn't giving them a clear picture. An alleged distraction due to business interests was one of the main motives for Palmeiras to relieve Luxemburgo of his managerial post less than halfway through this year's Brazilian championship. The players alluded to his late arrival at some training sessions, his early abandonment of others and his oversight of the signings of some simply sub-standard new recruits as an indicator that perhaps his heart wasn't in the job or that, just as plausibly, he was treating it with the same prioritisation that a pizza delivery boy gives his 'handy little earner', or the way a young subbing school teacher might view correcting and supervising summer exams; "just something to keep me ticking over whilst I plan the next few months ahead". A rather forlorn way of looking at a part-time job which earns you almost 2 million US dollars a year in a country where the minimum industrial wage is about 52 dollars a week.

Now, in keeping with the overall tone of this blog, which is to focus on the abstract side of the game, it is only fair to square the circle and ask: where does Luxemburgo fit into any discussion on the theoretical side of the Brazilian game?

Well, as mentioned above Luxe can expound for sustained periods on tactics when interviewed. He is generally coherent, persuasive and definitely enthusiastic about the subject matter. To give him credit, he does sometimes hold up a truth where others dare not tread. On a football review programme he enthralled the studio pundits who were cross examining him by dissecting the controversial issue of whether or not attack-minded full-backs were on the whole beneficial for the Brazilian game. Luxemburgo was keen to point out that most contemporary laterais have forgotten how to tuck in and defend around their 18-yard area, and that this was chiefly due to the excess of liberty afforded them by the presence of a third centre-back in many teams. The third centre-back, Luxemburgo argues, is only there as spare cover because increasingly Brazilian centre-backs are afraid to go one-on-one in a zonal marking game. The coach seemed to be hitting upon something insightful here, a line of reasoning which surely would have lead him to the preposterous overreliance upon destructive volantes, a seemingly immutable part of most Brazilian teams, whose coaches appear unwilling to dispose of them.

Instead, Luxe took the wrong turn to Damascus, failing to break out of the paradigm and instead refuting it from within. The problem, he insists, is that 3-5-2 is 5-3-2 no matter where it is played in the world. For him, the laterais and alas (wing-backs or alternatively wide-midfielders) have become indistinguishable from one another, so that adding a third centre-back is simply adding an extra defender to the back four whilst tweaking the system so that the laterais play with more license. What Luxemburgo is ignoring here, is the spectrum of different formations and approaches which Brazilian coaches have made over the past few years, and all featuring the use of a back three, as has been illustrated in a previous blogpost here.

What was really objectionable though, was Luxemburgo's attempts to vandalise the narrative surrounding the place of Brazilian coaches in history. Asking rhetorically (he himself invited the question), whether or not he considered himself to have been influenced by Tele Santana, the man from Nova Iguacu metaphorically tossed the purple gown and sceptre aside, instead striding across the royal boudoir to place the laurel wreath on his head. The crown in question was Mario Jorge Zagallo's.

"More than a child of Tele Santana, I consider myself to be a child of Zagallo..."

Quite aside from the pretension, what was really offensive was Luxemburgo's historical inaccuracy. Gesticulating and outlining discernable shapes of formations with his hands, he stated his dislike of 3-5-2 and his preference for 4-4-2 (meaning 4-2-2-2) which he claimed to be the hallmark of Brazilian football since Zagallo had invented it!

Now while it is true that Zagallo would later adopt this formation at the teams he managed from the 1980s onwards, it was completely inaccurate to attribute to his great 1970 World Cup-winning team the genesis of such a formation. Zagallo may later have been persuaded of its benefits, but his more compelling contribution was the legacy of his fluid 4-3-3, as practised at Mexico '70. Admittedly, the players ahead of the central-midfield duo of Clodoaldo and Gerson did enjoy much freedom to interchange positions, the same can be said of many modern sides who play for instance the 4-2-3-1, or perhaps even more emphatically the Roma and Manchester United sides of 2006-08.

All this, however, does not override the fact that Zagallo continued to field at least one outside-forward in the form of Jairzinho. As far as Luxemburgo is concerned, Jairzinho was a strike partner to Tostao, Pele was a meia alongside Rivellino and hence the 4-2-2-2. The trouble with this is that Tostao himself refutes it, not directly you understand, but rather in his testimony as to how that 1970 front line operated:

“There is a difference between the number tens of today and those of the past. In the past, great number tens were generally pontas-de-lança … They didn’t have the same function as the advanced midfield playmakers of today… The pontas-de-lança were forwards who dropped off to link up play…” Thus, Tostão’s exposition clearly gives short shrift to Luxemburgo’s idea that Pele was an advanced midfielder of any description. Pele was instead most definitely a forward of varying description. But Pele’s strike partner at the 1970 World Cup continues:
“Today’s advanced playmakers don’t exactly play the same way as the old midfield generals. These guys generally wore the No.8 shirt, roaming from one end to the other and organizing the play. The dream of every team was to boast a great number eight and a great number ten”

Tostão has on other occasions also elaborated on how he was surprised to be selected alongside Pele to start in 1970 given that both players mirrored each other in their roles at their respective clubs -“At Cruzeiro ..... I was the ponta-de-lança and Dirceu Lopes, was the midfield playmaker. “ For the 1970 World Cup, Zagallo impressed upon Tostão the need to improvise as a false number nine, to be the nominal reference point of the team’s attack.
In other words, Tostao operated much the way Rooney has done on occassion for Manchester United as the most central, though by no means static, attacking reference.

Another interesting comparison lies between the 4-3-3 of 1970 and that of 1962, both chiefly owing their conception to Zagallo the player and later Zagallo the coach. Both were assymetrical, both were broadly 4-3-3, but substantive differences set one apart from the other. Whilst Zagallo the player's self-conversion to a more withdrawn role from the wing to wide midfield was indeed intended as a concession to defensive solidity in a team with only two midfielders, the redeployment of Roberto Rivellino from left-wing (where he occassionally played for Corinthians when he wasn't playing the Gerson midfield general role) certainly depopulated the front line but concomitantly added a third body and a second playmaker to the midfield, so that we can say Rivellino acted as a playmaker starting from a vaguely advanced wide-midfield position. This contrasts strongly from the role of Zagallo as tornante, or box-to-box wide-midfielder.

All this is important because it stands athwart the prospective argument, an erroneous argument were it to be made, that Zagallo, as coach, was constantly nudging Brazilian football away from its more cavalier tactical set-up since 1958 (4-2-4) in gradual increments towards first 4-3-3 and then 4-4-2. Indeed, throughout the 1970s, most Brazilian teams fielded some form of 4-3-3 with at least one winger featuring as a constant in the attack which would indicate, given that successful prolific teams tend to serve as trend setters, that 4-4-2/4-1-3-2/4-2-2-2 had barely gotten a foothold in a landscape inspired by Zagallo.

My own contention, is that contrary to what Luxemburgo states, Brazilian 4-4-2 owes less to Zagallo and more to Tele Santana, or more accurate, to a misapplication and an evolutionary offshoot stemming from improvisations made by Tele between the 1982 and 1986 World Cups. Never mind the tragedy of Sarria in 82, a further insult to injury would be to lay at Santana's headstone all the ills which occur beneath the umbrella of more modern versions of 4-2-2-2 post-Parreira, what with the gradual subversion of traditional holding midfielders in favour of two or sometimes even three purely destructive anchors, and the subsequent, entirely predictable and necessitated abandonment of any elaborative play whatsoever.

Yes, it is true that Tele funneled most of the attacking play into the centre and with the overlapping full-backs used as a trademark weapon, but we shouldn't lose sight of the fact that he could still accommodate two players at the base of midfield who knew how to set attacks in motion whilst offering tactical rigour and screening the defence. An analogous set-up might be Xabi Alonso and Marcos Senna for Spain (Cerezo incarnate as Alonso, and Falcao - though much more a box-to-box dynamo - nevertheless does share the organising qualities of Senna). You know just how far things have travelled when the present first volante of the seleção (Gilberto Silva) is genuinely less comfortable with the ball at his feet than is the centre-back behind him (Lucio)!

Going by this formulation, the present Liverpool holding duo of Alonso-Mascherano, such a staple of Spanish tactical thinking over the past decade and one which has been occasionally derided in England for a perceived lack of adventurousness, would be deemed utopian in the post-Santana era. An organiser and an enforcer? No, too risk laden it would seem. Xabi Alonso would immediately be ushered off into the advanced midfield section, whilst Mascherano would be deemed too undermanned in destructive responsibilities to perform his job alone.

Ultimately, the question is not one of aesthetics or even philosophy, but with clarity. When no one can agree on what grounds they are debating, when so much accepted knowledge and orthodoxy is ill-established, what grounds are there for making a convincing argument either way? Iconoclastic posturing which can appear necessary and urgent under a given set of circumstances is shown up to be misplaced grandstanding. Thus even the most highly self-considering football people can muddy the waters, enshrouding the debate in a fog of confusion, but hey, as long as the lucre shines through in the pan, why desist?

Ones to Watch....

2009-07-02T22:48:00.000-03:00

Players who are setting the Brazilian championship alight and who could prove a a decent acquisition.....(more exhaustive profiles will be added in due course)

Ramires (Cruzeiro)- similar to a young Patrick Vieira. Fine tackling ability, indefatigueable, perfect as a box-to-box midfielder ( in a 4-3-1-2) or wing-back (like Jonas Gutierrez for Argentina) in a 3-5-2. Can also play as the freer of two holders in a 4-4-2/3-5-2. UPDATE: Now at Benfica in Portugal.

Kléber (Cruzeiro)- similar to a young Del Piero (when he still had pace) or a Sergio Aguero, with shades of David Villa (but not suitable as lone striker), preferably as a second striker in a 4-4-2/3-5-2 or even a No.10 in a 4-2-3-1 or 4-3-1-2 and then less effective though decent as a winger in 4-3-3; exquisite technique, excellent in crowded spaces, great awareness for feeding strike-partner. UPDATE: Now at Porto in Portuguese SuperLiga.

Pablo Guiñazú (Internacional) similar to Roy Keane or Daniele De Rossi (surging forward, shot from distance) in a 4-4-2 , and to Javier Mascherano (tactical brain, tackling ability) as the main defensive midfielder in 4-3-3/3-3-2-2.

Taison (Internacional)- similar to Balottelli or a young Thierry Henry; second-striker for a 4-4-2/3-5-2 or winger for a 4-3-3, incredible pace, directness/'verticalidad', courageousness at taking on opponents, good finisher, less indulgent than Robinho.

Hernanes (São Paulo) similar to Zidane ( his gait, ambidexterity, touch, vision) with Xabi Alonso (passing range, tactical mind, defensive awareness).

Ibson (Flamengo) similar to Deco, a busy little playmaker who doesn't need a free role to thrive), ideal as a No. 8/ 'ocho' (creative midfielder) in a 4-1-2-3/3-3-2-2, or as a No. 10 in 4-3-1-2/3-4-1-2/4-2-3-1. UPDATE: Now at Spartak Moscow.

3-5-2: dying in Europe, less so in Brazil

2009-06-14T20:47:00.000-03:00

Figure 1 (left): One of Muricy Ramalho's many and myriad formations at São Paulo.

It is almost common knowledge to observers of European football, that 3-5-2 is dead. Or at least dormant.

Regardless of which nation he comes from or which one he works in, whenever some benighted coach raises the prospect of setting up his team with anything other than a back four, he is greated as a mothballed eccentric oblivious to the march of progress. Now, clearly the Dutch-orginating 3-4-3 systems are granted an exception, as they have always seemed so avant-garde, almost too futuristic to become dated, and in terms of their 'etymology', they have very little history in common with the popular interpretations of 3-5-2.

None of the above is meant to discredit popular wisdom on the issue; indeed, European football's systems of three centre-backs have all tended to share common characteristics and have by-and large been superceded by back four systems largely because their effectiveness became neutralised by the latter. On other counts, even in those departments where comparative advances were seemingly offered by back-three systems, such as allowing both full-backs to advance simulataneously, these advantages have been largely co-opted by the back four, whose modern full-backs now benefit from improved athleticism and stamina and thus do a splendid imitation job of the old wing-backs.

Already, right here and speaking of terminology alone, we are entering murky waters: is it correct to speak of wing-backs as the liberated full-backs who accompanied three central defenders (in a 5-3-2 for example)? Or, post-liberation, were they now wide midfielders in a 3-5-2?

Some will argue it makes little difference, but here again some elaboration is crucial, since there were some substantial differences, not only in terms of how they historically developed, but more broadly in the sense of how they represented a team's general approach. Was three (or five) at the back a statement of stinginess or a declaration of risk-laden attacking intent? We can enter into greater detail and pay greater heed to these nuances later on, but now let us turn the focus to Brazil and assume for simplicity sake, that a European's perception of 3-5-2 has been boiled down to two major strands.

These two varieties are not, as one might presume, 3-5-2 and 5-3-2: rather, they have more to do with the composition of the back three. Whether it is three defenders marking zonally, or two man-markers and a sweeper. Yes, the sweeper himself can be anything from another centre-back with good ball control and distribution to an erstwhile midfield playmaker (Beckenbauer, Schuster and Scirea).

In countries where the back four was firmly engrained, there were -largely confused- attempts to introduce 3-5-2 and wed it to the prevailing characteristics in place. Thus, across much of northern Europe, the tendency was to maintain the existing back four and simply add an extra centre-back. This was fairly perceived as a more cautious approach, as players who had been accumstomed to marking zonally found it difficult to reconcile themselves to man-marking, despite the cover of the spare man, and still the attacking width was being provided by those same full-backs from the preceding back four, which was not often given their more conservative nature.

Why not so often? Because under a back four system, and until the Brazilian-inspired trend would reach European shores a decade later, both full-backs did not attack simultaneously. While one advanced, the other would move closer to the centre-backs to form a back three strung across most of the width of the pitch. This was intended to be reciprocal, with each full-back deputising for the other. Moreover, a keen defensive positional sense was a must of both players most notably when both were to align themselves tightly on either side of their centre-backs when around their own 18-yard area. In other words, neither full-back was autonomous of the defensive line. None of these requirements apply to a wing-back. Indeed, it is a common criticism modern attacking full-backs in a line of four that they are postionally suspect. Equally, the charge levelled at more conservative full-backs such as Gary Neville is that while they are terrifically solid players and great defenders of wide areas they are insuffuciently thrusting in attack for the requirements of today's game (-my own personal solution for the supposed obsolecence of such players is that they necessarily become natural candidates for wide-defender roles in a back three, but that's a matter for another day).

Suffice to say, that a plausible defintion of a pure wing-back is that of an wide player equally disposed to defence and attack (and who is not a winger, let that be clear!) and who lacks the positional nous of a full-back. In other words, he is a pure wide-midfielder. An attacking full-back is a wing-back with the positional nous (and usually the height) required to play in a back four.

In many British teams who converted to 3-5-2, another, different kind of difficulty arose; the existing inclination towards zonal marking extended to the newly constituted back three. Even the Balkan and later Italian variants (particularly 3-4-1-2), in which the system was zonal, were still predicated on the opponent using two strikers, and so redundancy was one tactical adjustment away if the opposition simply used one less forward than there were spare defenders. Hence 4-3-3, 4-1-4-1, 4-2-3-1 and the like could render the 3-5-2 unbalanced, overmanned (in defence) and even undermanned (in midfield) to varying degrees.

In Brazil, these deficiencies have yet to be faced, mainly because most teams play with two forwards of some description and wingers have yet to make a reappearance. But another explanation for this persistence lies in the increasing complexity of some Brazilian formations, particularly 3-5-2. Asymmetry is common, often intentionally so (as was the case under the famously lopsided zona mista which was both a back four and a back three at the same time) with many coaches simply laying out the formation in such a way as to account for their players' natural tendencies. In attempting to redress inherited defensive problems, Brazilian coaches who adapted 3-5-2 conversely found new opportunites for offensive play unfold before them. An example of this is Flamengo and São Paulo sides of recent years.

Deliberate unbalance: how this can make a team more solid

As mentioned before, some Brazilian takes on 3-5-2 are asymmetrical and therein evocative of gioco all'italiana, albeit clearly without a sweeper system. Take one of the cagier Brazilian sides like Sao Paulo, for instance: coach Muricy Ramalho was forever tweaking his side and so well rehearsed were they, that the same starting 11 could play as a back four or a back three without any recourse to for substitutions. They would typically play with three centre-backs, a full-back, a wing-back, two holding midfielders, an attacking midfielder (stationed wide), and two forwards.

In 2006, Ramalho inherited a solid side at a club already reknowned for its institutional stability behind the scenes. He was loathe to risk changing the team's style: defending deeply and springing counter-attacks, and also using a target man upfield as an "out-ball". They would go on to win three consecutive championships. But where Muricy did lend a distinctinctive touch was in the arrangement of his players on the field.

The whole system was one of weights and balances so that hardly any defensive position would be vacated without another player filling it in. The midfield behaved almost like a chain - much the same way a classic back four tends to. So, for example, how to explain the gaps behind the wing-back on the left - who would cover for him? As shown below in Figure 1, that would be one of the volantes (defensive midfielders) who would then move out to the flank. But in doing so, he would abandon his post just in front of the back three and so the right-wing back (who was often a full-back or even a volante by trade) would tuck into the centre to become the screening presence there.

Normallly the attacking midfielder (meia), who was stationed to the left would move infield thus leaving room for the left wing-back to overlap. But equally, the meia could stay relatively wide and thus allow the wing-back to launch a diagonal run infield. So we are left with a two man left-sided midfield who alternated their inside and outside movements. Who would help the advancing right-back when the weight of the side was tilted towards the left? That would be the job of the second striker who would drop out wide to assist. As can be seen, there was no symmetry to Ramalho's system but there was an intensely-laboured synchronisation about the collective movement.

Freeing the wing-backs to advance infield

In the case of a more attack-minded team, we have the example of Flamengo, and we see a more interesting use of the the third centre-back, in this case a conservative full-back or a tenacious volante. This formation was not borne out of a desire to shore up the centre-backs, but rather to maximise the dynamism of the wing-backs.

Below left: Flamengo's more adventurous 3-5-2 (or 3-1-4-2).

In Leo Moura and Juan, coach Cuca had at his disposal two bonafide wing-backs whom he did not trust to perform in a back four. The solution lay in an interesting back three consisting of two centre-backs plus a conservative full-back, with a defensive midfielder just ahead plugging whichever spaces were most vulnerable. The central midfield was occupied by the dynamic box-to- box player Kleberson with a genuine playmaker Ibson playing in a slightly more advanced position. Cuca's system gave both wing-backs (now defacto wide-midfielders) plenty of licence to cut inside, not just in rapid counter-attacks, but also to participate in passages of patient build up play. Both are expected to double back and assist the quasi-full backs (the centre backs who push out to defend the flanks).

In this aspect at least, the system echoes England's variation at Euro '96 whereby Terry Venables played Neville and Pearce as wide defenders in a three, with Ince dropping in from midfield and with wide midfielders ( two from Anderton and McMannaman or Le Saux ) pushing on. In effect we are left with a back three that can behave like a back four without resorting to a designated sweeper. In Flamengo's set-up, we see a novel use of the third centre-back. By sucking the opposing markers into the centre, Leo Moura leaves space for the pseudo centre-back behind him to bomb ahead as a surprise element to the Flamengo attack as illustrated in Figure 2.

Emphasis on defense: wing-backs not trusted to defend in a back four.

Below: Palmeiras line-up in a 3-5-2 (which leans towards 3-4-1-2 when in possession and 3-4-2-1 when not) despite the coach's misgivings about the system.

It must be said however, that in complete contrast to Flamengo, there are many Brazilian teams who use 3-5-2 for the purposes of playing an overtly defensive game, hoping to hit teams on the counter-attack. The most puzzling exponent of this (in that he is hardly amongst the more defensive of Brazilian coaches) the Palmeiras side coached by, until recently, Wanderley Luxemburgo. Palmeiras tend to play very deep and adopt 3-4-2-1 in defensive phase (sometimes even dropping the second-striker for another 'meia' as a more cautious approach.) Paradoxically, Luxemburgo is a big critic of three-at-the-back but offers as his defense a lack of trust in the ability of his wing-backs to defend properly- amongst the most common of the justifications cited by European coaches who are reluctant to switch to a back three. Luxemburgo laments that Brazilian defences have lost the chain effect whereby if one full-back advances, both centre-backs shift across and the other full-back tucks in tightly defend as a temporary centre-back.

Another such coach who is reticent about 3-5-2 is current Grêmio boss Paulo Autuori, for whom the 3-4-1-2, as practiced by the side he took command of in May 2009, is prejudicial to midfield creativity. This is because, Autuori claims, (and though I do not profess to understand his reasoning) one of his two meias (from his preferred 4-2-2-2 system) finds himself obliged to drop deeper into midfield, or else be replaced by a second volante. Evidently the presence of a third central defender is not enough comfort for even this more liberal of Brazilian coaches. Which again leads to that inescapable point; that there is no getting away from this.. the besottment of most modern Brazilian coaches with destructive volantes.

A future post will deal with this and analyse the possible ways out for those coaches who want to keep a solid midfield base but without inhibiting decent circulation of the ball from the back.

Brazilian debate over 3-5-2 and midfielders

2009-05-21T17:34:00.000-03:00

The following is my response to an article by Brazilian journalist Marcelo Costa on the thorny subject of playing 3-5-2. Marcelo works for, amongst other publications, Estado de Minas and Hoje em Dia , plus PUC TV. He was stating a current disillusionment with the system of three-at-the back, not so much, as he sees it, due to the system itself, but rather because of the personnel entrusted to execute it, and the counter-productive effects that their prevalence is having on even those systems which feature a back four. Most specifically his gripe is with a target identical to what I have identified in a previous post, namely the preponderance of destructive midfielders clustered around the centre and the decadence of build-up play from the defensive-to-middle thirds of the pitch.

*** Please note: correction to the piece below since it was written: I had wrongly attributed the invention of the Pirlo role as the creation of coach Carlo Mazzone. It emerges that Pirlo himself was the one who suggested he adapt his game in such a way.

Below is a link to Marcelo's excelent blog,

http://www.esquemastaticos.blogspot.com/

" I fully agree with you, Marcelo.

That having been said, why don’t you write an antitdote to the ills of those teams that currently play 3-5-2? This way, you could suggest some alternatives illustrating where for example Tcheco ought to play in this formation, or to find a way for Sport to relieve Paulo Baier of sole creative responsibility. Just an idea.

The thing about Pirlo is that we have one of those rare cases in modern football in which a coach makes a completely innovative tactical revolution: Pirlo used to play as a technically exquisite No. 10, with almost no defensive traits. The idea of coach Carlo Mazzone (in Brescia) and later copied by Ancelotti was to place him behind two ‘pit bulls’, and so the team gained in creative capacity, even more so than would have been the case were it an organising holder such as Rafael Carioca, Fernando Redondo, Marcos Senna or Xabi Alonso. And yet without losing the ability to press and rob in the middle.

By my reckoning there are three types of holding midfielder in modern football (and this excludes box-to-box midfielders such as Ramires, Vieira or Muntari), and then there is the ‘auxiliary centre-back’ or terceiro zagueiro.

1) CLASSIC HOLDING PLAYER: No.5, Clodoaldo, Toninho Cerezo (and later Redondo, Carrick, Xabi Alonso); overtly tactical, great reader of the game, with capacity to disarm but without running around or pressing so much, also, an excellent distributor of the ball.

2) VOLANTE DESTRUCTIVO: a more modern version, with a greater ability to destroy tempered by more limited vision and technique: see Dunga, Makelele and Mascherano.

3) THE PIRLO ROLE: almost unheard of before or since; converting an offensive linkman into a creator deep inside his own half. Needs the assistance of one or two enforcers.

4) TERCEIRO ZAGUEIRO (AUXILIARY DEFENDER): in a 3-5-2, this is the centre-back who usually brings out the ball into midfield. In a 4-4-2/4-3-3 etc, he tends to be a destructive midfielder.

I believe that the tone of the team, and the style which it intends to impose in a game, is in great part determined by the type(s) of holding midfielder(s) chosen to start.

Let us take for example the Brazilian 3-4-2-1/3-4-1-2 from World Cup 2002; at least Scolari was forced to make a change, bringing on a box-to-box player to partner the holding midfielder Gilberto Silva; imagine what would have unfolded if Emerson Gaúcho, the destructive midfielder who was to partner Gilberto, had not been injured. Something ugly surely would have ensued.

Overview of Brazilian Football Part II:

2009-05-19T15:01:00.000-03:00

We have already discussed the reappearance of wingers in Brazilian football, or ar least an attempt to play with wide predominantly attacking players. But this remains an exception to the rule. So how did we get here in the first place? How aware are Brazilians of the evolution that has ocurred in their game? And are they satisfied with its fruits?

I have also commented that playing at outside-forward should be second skin to what would constitute most people's idea of a typical Brazilian player; one who is adept at dribbling and beating his opponent in 1 vs 1 situations. This latter characteristic tends is as true today as it was fifty years ago; in comparison to, say, Argentine football, regardless of the differing schools, styles and formations there, there is a proclivity for individualism in Brazilian football in contrast to the more collectively-aware ethos of the Argentines and Uruguayans. Brazilian players are inclined to hold on to the ball for longer instead of seeking a pass, and either draw the foul for their team win some space for themselves.

I'm not sure whether or not I overstate the case here, but there is also a tendency in Brazilian club football for everyone to seek a route through the middle. It is not uncommon to witness a player, even a wing-back, receive the ball on the flank, drive forward, and then suddenly put his foot on the ball, bring his trajectory to a pause and proceed to move into the centre of the pitch and almost at a canter, as if he were expecting to find there acres of space and time to weigh his options.

That he might expect to find space and time in central areas is at once paradoxical and logical. Paradoxical in the sense that already the centre of the pitch is overpopulated - watching one game I counted at least eight players congregating in an area roughly equivalent to the size of one half of the centre-circle. And this in a style of football which features much less pressing than is the norm in Europe. It is logical in the sense that Brazilian coaches instill in their players the practice of abandoning large chunks of the field in the hope that opposition markers will dragged out of position, thereby enabling a teammate to fill the vacuum created there. Observers of Scolari's Chelsea will have seen it all before.

All of which brings me to the following point: that Brazilian football is remarkably similar to pre-Sacchian Italian football of the 70s and 80s; not so much catenaccio as gioco all' italiana, an equally meticulous though much less-miserly form of football which was unaccurately derided by foreign supporters and media. But in what way did this style of football mirror today's football in the Brasileirão? In two ways.

Firstly there is the practice of man-marking. Not in defence, you must understand - after all, the Brazilians arguably invented the zonal defending back four and are loathe to jettison it, but rather in midfield. Secondly, there is the assymetrical nature of many Brazilian formations. Very rarely will you see a coach send out his players in a clearly defined formation- this has been a marked tendency in recent years. In a way, this might be a natural consequence of the increasing tacticality of football here: the exodus of top-quality individual talent has left coaches as protagonists who must try to out-think their opponents. Hence many formations which on paper appear as 4-2-2-2 or 3-5-2 or whatever, are in fact a hybrid, designed to morph seamlessly without the coach having to resort to substitutions.

All of which lends itself to a cat-and-mouse game of trying to second-guess the opponent, and considering that there is little competitive difference between the top and bottom teams in the championship, often it comes down to the details. You seek to punish your opponents' mistakes rather than try tipping the scales with outstanding differential talent.

It is unfortunate perhaps that Brazilian punditry and coaching jargon have done more than most to portray in such simplistic and reductionist light the tactical sophisitication inherent in the domestic game. They frequently cite mantras of 4-4-2, 3-5-2 and 3-6-1 (these three being the most common) as immutable staples when the reality is better reflected in European-style assignations of four-band systems, hence: 4-2-2-2, 3-3-2-2, 3-4-2-1 and the like. But of such obsequience of language can be attributed to an understandable desire for brevity on the part of Brazilians, it does also point to a certain cultural insularity. There has been an unwillingness to incorporate foreign trends perhaps comparable to the enduring British and Scandanavian reverence for flat 4-4-2 as a seemingly default order to which all teams would naturally revert once those pesky tinkering managers have faded into the background. Which, incidentally, is a nonsense supported by neither history nor common sense.

Attempting to explain the prediliction for three centre-backs, Wanderley Luxemburgo recently lectured on a Brazilian TV that the modern Brazilian centre-back is afraid of being exposed to 1-v-1 or 2-v-2 situations and that the cover traditionally afforded him by his proximate full-back has been scuppered by a lack of positional nous on the part of the latter, whom Luxemburgo now calls alas -"wing-backs"- in all but name. Luiz Felipe Scolari said as much in 2002 when defending his, ultimately successful, deployment of three at the back: "Our full-backs (Robert Carlos and Cafu) don't know how to defend". Recently-installed Grêmio coach, Paulo Autuori is disdainful of 3-5-2, declaring that it detracts from the creative capacity of central midfield, yet Autuori is only telling half of the story.

Trapped within the Parreira paradigm, any alteration between this kind of 4-2-2-2 and 3-5-2, despite the changes it brings to the full/wing-backs, it is unsubstantial in terms of how it affects the centre midfield; regardless if one player is positioned as a third centre-back or further ahead as an additional anchorman, both men who assist the two centre-backs are essentially destroyers.

With regards the central arrangement of 4-2-2-2, this is not to be confused with the Spanish "double pivot", which basically has two permutations, with the first strand being more accentuated on creativity; destroyer plus organiser (Mascherano and Alonso, Diarra and Gago) or destroyer plus box-to-box dynamo (Albelda and Baraja, Hargreaves and Fletcher, Petit and Vieira). The unifying factor here in the Spanish school is that roles be not duplicated and the ball does not become bogged down in inertia, as was the case when Capello's Real Madrid 2006-07 played a more Parreira-esque double pivot with two identical destroyers, Diarra and Emerson. Might he have wished to enact a Parreira-style 3-5-2, Capello need only have withdrawn one of the pair to augment the central defence, but the underlying problem would remain that of who could initiate play from the defensive-to-middle thirds, now dragging one of the more advanced midfielders into the vortex: Parreira's system opens a pandora's box with a resultant race towards extremes.

By the same token however, there are Brazilian versions of 3-5-2 which owe little to Parreira and even offer an intriguing contrast to the more rigid European stylings of this system. Such a comparative analysis will be the the subject of a future post here.

Apologia

2009-05-18T15:02:00.000-03:00

For the purpose of clarity throughout these posts, I will indulge in citing more internationally-recognisable footballers than their South American-based counterparts who share similar characteristics. Thus, a mention of Barcelona's Daniel Alves can easily invoke to a non-Brazil based audience the functioning of an attacking left full-back as is Flamengo's Leo Moura. This is something which I will frequently resort to when explaining tactical maneouvres or indeed when outlining players' profiles, like in the case of the pre-mentioned Moura. And while some Brazilian readers may justifiably bemoan such parrochialism at a time when Brazilian clubs, typified by Corinthians' measured exertions in signing Ronaldo, are focusing their marketing strategies on capturing the attentions of a global audience, it is my hope that, far from reinforcing ignorant or rose-tinted Old World perspectives of Brazilian and South American football, my writing will at least give some indication to those with even the remotest of curiosity.

The dynamics of world football's economics leave little room for deviation from certain norms, namely that professional talent will inevitably be funneled towards those leagues where remuneration is most handsome and recongnition is most groomed. Such laws appear immutable but their elasticites may sometimes conspire in favour of the conveyor-belt countries and this has been seen with the recent Brazilian economic boom, the appreciation of its currency, and also the resilience of its economy at a time when European, North American, indeed most world economies are in deep recession. If Europe's big spending clubs this summer find themselves lacking in any serious cash to throw around and even less likely to avail of credit, do not be surprised to see a flow of Brazilian players leaving their European and Japanese-based clubs making their way back home. The flow right now may be a mere trickle and in a sense it is nothing we have not witnessed before, but its exponential impact could be profound.

There is a sunstantial difference between this more recent movement of players and the previous cavalcade of returnees. The latter have been a mainstay of Brazil's import-export balance for the past two decades: veteran players returning for a swansang, often to the club with which they were most identified or indeed young players whose unfulfilled potential, misfortunes with injury or bad career moves by agents too quick to dispense ill-advice. On the other hand, this new phenomenon is quality-based in its exponents typically comprised the elite of domestic players when they left and still maintain this competitive advantage now that they are returning.

The purposes and projected duration of these homecomings do, of course, vary. Some players are merely homesick and trying to put emotional and lifestyle problems behind them- whether they view their participation in the Brazilian league as a more respectable form of rehab remains to be seen. Some may feel that their wage packets have already reached a peak, their savings accounts are relatively secured and that emotionally they have fallen so low that their is no other avenue left for them in which enjoy their football save for one of the bigger Brazilian domestic teams. Other players are doubtlessly using this soujourn as a means to keep fit and stay in the shop window, biding their time and assessing the possibilities of how best to relaunch their hitherto frustrated careers in the elite leagues of the world. Regardless of the causes, the consequences for the Brazilian league and indeed for South American football as a whole can only be an improvement in the quality of football being played, and also a greater and better-marketed television coverage and potentially, though one court accusations of naivety here, an investment in the logistical, security and infrastructural arrangements at stadiums.

Having said all this, I am loathe to focus my attentions here through the prism of star players like Adriano, Ronaldo and Fred, as I feel that amongst the lesser-known lights of these parts there is so much more to absorb, dissect and ultimately learn from. There is a certain culture of indifference that emanates from the big European leagues and the media which focus on them and it conspires, however indirectly, to dismiss all football outside of a certain radius as not just unworthy of attention but also as inconsequential to the comings and goings in the epicentre of football. It is the second attitude here which is easier to address. If I were a Manchester United or a Juventus supporter, for instance, I am pretty sure that I would want to know where the next recruit to my club is coming from. Take Anderson, for instance. Following a difficult first season as during which his form as a primarily central midfielder seemed patchy, I imagine a United supporter would be much more foregiving had he known that the lad had previously played in a completely different position under his previous clubs FC Porto and Grêmio.

It is also my wish, however, to avoid banging the drum of victimisation; of spouting the usual tropes that rapacious, fat, arrogant Europeans who are too possessed of money and too poorly endowed of talented footballing youth are pillaging Brazil of its resources in order to suit their need for armchair entertainment. First of all, the Brazilian clubs themselves are more than willing sellers, and whatever the machinations of agents and the understandable frustrations of fans who see their young idols whisked away, the Brazilian federation would be in a considerable position to at least staunch and regulate the flow of players, imposition of transfer windows, and compensation for all parties involved in the transaction, were it not so beholden to corruption and political chicanery. Secondly, the ignorance of Brazilian footballing sensitivities on the part of European is to a great extent matched by insularity on the part of Brazilians towards non-Brazilian football. As a country, Brazil has not become any poorer since the heady days of thelate 70s/ early 1980s when it could be argued that teams such as Flamengo were at least the equal of- if not better and more blessed in talent than- European giants like Liverpool. But I digress, as a sociological commentator I imagine my observations to be riddled with shoddy claims, as an economist, even worse so, and so I can only speak from the most superficial of vantage points as to how I perceive the present reality of the game here. But for all my cynicism and disheartenment at what I see here, I must profess a profound fascination with the dynamism and innovation of Brazilian football, and a resulting need to discuss it

After all, even in this global game with the economic realities underpinning it, the peculiarities of local culture cannot be completely trumped by the vicissitudes of the market and the blandishment of generic appeal.

Brazilian football overview: Part 1 - "Where have all the wingers gone?"

2009-05-15T13:20:00.000-03:00

Whilst peering through a team preview for last week's Brazilian Cup quarter-final in the clash between Corinthians and Fluminense, I was struck by something unusual. Or at least, were I to imagine myself as a Brazilian reader under 40 years old, I would consider as unusual the diagram (see figure above) of the intended team line-ups before me. Both Mano Menezes (Corinthians) and Carlos Alberto Parreira (Fluminense) intended to send out their respective sides to face each other in a broadly 4-3-3 formation. It might seem rash to say this, but this was certainly revolutionary if not in fact a novelty. After all, how could it be a novelty when most Brazilian sides of the 1970s would recongisably line up in a 4-3-3 formation, be this symmetrical, loosely-defined or otherwise - but always featuring at least one winger. Revolutionary perhaps, if indeed we are faced with a return to old ways.

And yet, speaking in 2009, an entire generation of Brazilians have grown up without witnessing wingers. To be sure, there have been close encounters and unconfirmed sightings. In recent years there has been Denilson Araújo, who with his shimmies and feints, and of course the obsequious multiple stepovers, threatened to evoke echos of Garrincha. The palpable sense of excitement of his adolescent days at Sao Paulo, or when he came off the bench for Brazil in the 1998 as a potential match-winner, a wild-card, an unknown element to upset the best laid strategies of opposition coaches turned out to be, well, just that; potential.

Nowadays, an august Denilson plays his football for third-division outfit Itumbiara in the rural midwest state of Goiás, but even when he was plying his trade at top sides Real Betis or even more recently Palmerias, there was always the feeling that this was an interloper, an incorrigible maverick, doubtlessly talented but not one to reciprocate confidence of coaches nor supporters. Maybe some perceptive and personable coach could have honed his individual and individualist qualities into a more durable and wieldy weapon for the benefit of collective endeavours. Maybe. But the sad fact is that no Brazilian child is today encouraged to base his game around that of Denilson.

Now, such despondance begs the question: who has failed the prospective wingers of Brazilian football; its exemplars? Oh, Denilson is a poor role model all right, but that is very selective and incriminatory pickings from a shallow pool. How about identifying and nurturing a better exponent of wing-play then? Now we are questioning the remit of the teachers and coaches, for they don't seem intent on producing wingers anyway; good, bad or mediocre.

It would appear that the Brazilian outside-forward has become a relic of the past, so much so that we might now lavish praise upon a mobile, tricky young forward by saying "Look at how he attacks the space vacated by the full-back; he almost plays like a ponta (winger)!" This could be said of a player like Robinho, who doubtlessly prefers to enjoy a vaguely defined role supporting a more central striker, as does (or did) Thierry Henry, despite their propensity for making effective wide runs. These are players who tend to start from a central position and then find space out wide, rather than starting from wide and then probing for space in more central areas as do, say, Leo Messi and Franck Ribery.

The Robinho role is undoubteldy the most selfish of roles in modern football. Selfish, I say, not as a character judgement, but rather in the sense that such a style of play carries with it so many potential rewards and comparatively little concomitant responsibility. Imagine if you will the following scenario of failures and recriminations. The team was wasteful with chance after chance around the box? - the No. 9 is sure to carry the can. We failed to execute enough crosses and all our attacks became funnelled into the centre? - blame the winger(s). Our build-up play was intricate and pleasing on the eye and yet we failed to provide a penetrative pass to suit the runs of our forwards?- why, I do believe your shirt to be the No. 10, Mr Riquelme! The final point here is paramount. As Jonathan Wilson of the Guardian points out in his tactical history "Inverting the Pyramid", the linkman, No.10, enganche, call-it-what-you-may, as is Riquelme, is always held culpable when the team built around him and which affords him so much licence fails. And yet arguably the 9-and-a-half such as Robinho enjoys even greater liberty of movement, yet fails to get tagged with the artistic burden of the playmaker. No wonder such a player would be recalcitrant when a coach asks him to play a more specific wide-attacking role.

Pelé started as an outside-left for Santos in the mid-1950s but was undoubtedly possesed enough of goal-scoring capability plus imginative passing that he was soon coaxed into the more advanced of the two inside-forward roles, the ponta-da-lança. A generation later, Zico was cut from a similar cloth. The candidate for that role was to be the supreme anarchic talent of the side, the one payer whose sheer unbridled spontaneity was incidentally and conveniently beneficial to the group as a whole. If genius is indeed the price required for the enjoyment of such liberty, is every schoolboy who even vaguely resembles Robinho its benficiary today?

Parreira's innovation with respect to the Corinthians game is significant insofar as this is the coach who is most identified with the modern template for Brazilian football; that densely layered 4-4-2 which relies on two ultra-defensive holding players in order to liberate the attacking full-backs and to allow the possibility (whenever Parreira felt inclined to summon the courage) of the creative elements congregating in more central areas of the pitch. Something which European observers might loosely define as a 4-2-2-2. One analysis of Parreira's legacy has been made by Tim Vickery, the BBC's South American football correspondent. Vickery has traced the ills of today's Brazilian national team as partly originating in this system of Parreira's; an overreliance on full-backs for width and crosses, a poor initial transition of the ball from defence to midfield, and an even less imaginative circulation of the ball from midfield onwards, what given the prevalence of destructively-inclined midfielders.

Indeed, Vickery's diagnosis was all too apparent at the 2006 World Cup, during which Parreira felt compelled to shoehorn four, sometimes even five!, attacking players within the existing confines of his system. The result was that Brazil was a broken team, almost seismically divided between destroyers and creators; there were no cadences, no in between players, no apparent place for those players who would smooth over the divisions between the different sectors of defence, midfield and attack. Consequentially, Brazil were lethargic and unpurposeful when in possession of the ball against comparatively well-organised teams, yet they were, and still remain, a formidable counter-attacking force against those teams who dared to outplay them.

Nevertheless, Parreira's decision to line up his team in a rough 4-3-3 entailed a positional adjustment for, arguably his most talented player, Thiago Neves. Having recently returned from a frustrating six-month period at SV Hamburg -via Al-Hilal on loan- where he failed to make much of an impact, the 24-year old was reassigned to a wide attacking position on the left. Thiago, who, though at just under 6ft is not as tall, bears a remarkable resemblence to Cristiano Ronaldo in temperament, athletic physique, movement and style of play, is anxious to recover the impressive form which deserted him after his move to Europe; a style of play that boasted dribbling, accurate shooting and not inconsiderable aerial power. This much cannot have gone unnoticed by Parreira, who in previous times might well have been tempted to play Neves in his more familiar roles at second-striker or attacking midfielder.

Quite how the moody Curitiba-born player repsonds to his new role over the course of a sustained run of games remains to be seen. What shouldn't surprise us is to see the role of winger so well-fitting to the enduring characteristics of Brazilian football; that of the mazy, ball-hugging individualist eager to leave opponents trailing in his wake and thus create situations numerical superiority for his team mates.

2009-05-11T16:15:00.000-03:00

A proposal for Barça's gameplan vs United: Complications and Solutions

Complications:

A) Alves suspended = no overlapping right back.
B) Abidal suspended = no left back of defensive & offensive measure;
Sylvinho = defensive liability
C) Etoo' not looking goal-sharp, plus poor build-up play!
D) Messi shackled from right-wing (as No.7) if Fergie repeats Hiddink plan
E) Maybe O'Shea starts at right-back for Utd.
F) Aerial threat from Ronaldo & Berbatov vs centre-backs
G) Barça badly need "llegada", late arrivals to the 'second ball' in the box, shots from distance, pick-up rebounds.

Solutions for the points above:

A) = 1) Puyol or Cáceres at right-back, rely on wingers for offensive width.
= 2) Keita as right-wing back in midfield

B) = 3) Puyol as left-sided defender in a back three
= 4) Puyol as left-back
= 5) Keita as right-footed left-back, diagonal runs forward, shots from
distance
= 6) Keita as left-wing-back in midfield

C) = 7) Henry as No.9
= 8) Bojan as No.9

D) = 9) Messi as '"false" No. 9 dropping off....Etoo as left (No. 11) /right
-winger (No. 7)
= 10) Messi as left-wing (no.11)!!!

E) = 11) O'Shea easy victim for pace & poor technique. Space behind him
= diagonal killer passes cut-back from the end-line.

F) = 12) Piqué & Touré
13) Piqué & Cáceres
14) Piqué & Busquets .....in each, no Puyol at centre-back!

G) = 17) Keita breaking from left-midfield
= 18) Diagonal runs by Etoo onto second post.

Unforseeable factors:
O'Shea at right-back or Ferguson boldly picks Rafael?
Ronaldo at centre-forward, in the hole, or out wide?

Conclusions:
Puyol at full-back [l/r] only in a back four; In a back three? = wide defender; for either = not at centre-back, lack of height!

Messi is Barça's ONLY source of left-width (excl. Sylvinho). Not even a full-back or wing-back! = unless Barça want to ignore the left flank, then play Messi here. Plain advantage in 1 x 1 vs O'Shea. Park or Ronaldo obliged to track back = United's right-wing offense largely disarmed. Messi loses individual protaganism but benefits the team. Likelihood of assists.Messi at outside-left (No.11)!

Henry has experience of playing with his back to big Premiership defenders; better in build-up play than Etoo = essential for bringing midfielders into play near the box; better heading power than Etoo, not only for goals but also for flick-ons and assists. Henry as No. 9!

Barça need shots from late-arrivals, scraps and ghosting diagonal runs between Evra and Vidic = Etoo' at outside-right (No.7)! + Keita arriving from midfield for the third ball.

Iniesta to play as centrally as possible; even as No.10 (mobile, Modric-style, not static Riquelme-style) if formation permits...regardless, often must seek to drift behind backs of United's holder(s) for "hooking through" Barça runners beyond United's midfield line; also to take shots from distance.

Potential for goals:
-diagonal crosses from Messi (left) and Etoo (right) for Henry (centre).
-diagonal cut-backs from Messi (left) and Etoo (right) for Keita arriving from left-of-centre.
-scraps and rebounds for Etoo' at far post from midfielders' deflected shots and headed flick-ons from Henry.

OPTION A = 4-1-2-3

Cáceres/Keita----------Piqué---------------Touré/Busquets-----------------Puyol

-----------------------------------------Busquets/Touré-----------------------------------------

--------------------------Xavi-------------------------------------------Iniesta--------------------

Etoo'-------------------------------------- -Henry---------------------------------------Messi

OPTION B = 3-1-2-1-3 (diamond midfield, risky, less likely)

--------- -Cáceres----------------------Piqué--------------------------Puyol-------------

-----------------------------------------------Touré--------------------------------------------

---

-----------------Xavi-----------------------------------------------------Keita----------------

-----------------------------------------------Iniesta---------------------------------------------

Etoo'---------------------------------------Henry--------------------------------------Messi

OPTION C 4-1-2-3 (similar to Madrid derby if Rafael doesn't play)

Cáceres/Keita--------Piqué------------Touré/Busq------------------Puyol

-------------------------------------Busq/Touré---------------------------------

---------------------Xavi------------------------------------Iniesta---------------

---------------------------------------Messi--------------------------------------------

-----Etoo--------------------------------------------------------------------Henry--

Reflexiones pos-Stamford Bridge

2009-05-11T16:11:00.000-03:00

Malísimo partido de Alves, que falló no sé cuántas veces los cruzamentos: ¿resulta tan difícil ejecutar un buen cruzamento? Los comentaristas pos-partido británicos decían que al Barça hasta le vendría bien su ausencia en la final. Exagerados, claro que son, pero el rendimiento de Dani fue algo decepcionante. Queda claro que contra el Manchester el Barça no dispondrá de ningún lateral derecho de gran proyección ofensiva. Pero este puede llegar a ser una baza. Dejadme explicar como: con Puyol de lateral derecho, no padeceremos aquellas lagunas de espacio a la espalda que te ocurre con Daniel. Y con Cristiano Ronaldo de 9 tirando hacia la banda (véanse de dónde surgió su asistencia para el primer tanto vs el Arsenal) nos vendría bien un lateral de corte defensivo como es Puyi. Encima, Puyol como central contra el poderio aéreo de Cristiano huele a un sucidio. Prefiero una pareja Pique - Cáceres; el uruguayo para salir a combatir a Cristiano a unos 20-25 metros del gol, y el catalán para barrer como líbero algunos metros por detrás de él. Para el extremo derecho del Barca (si es que Pep escala un 4-3-3) va a ser preciso un trabajador para ayudar a Puyol en los 2-x-2 contra Rooney y Evra. ¿Va a ser Etoo'? El camarunés no hizo mérito ninguno en semi-finales como para ganarse el puesto de '9'. Para el extremo izquierdo, me encantaría que Pep probase de una vez a Messi de 11, de jugar por ahi O'Shea, lentísimo y mermado de técnica, Leo le ganaría la espalda a enteros y el barca se daria con el pase de muerte a menudo...pase de muerte desde la linea de fondo...¿para quien? pues Henry de '9' y Iniesta inifiltrando desde segunda línea. Titi lleva una vida luchando de espaldas contra los defensas rocosos en la Premier. Por cierto, por no si fuese comentado ya mil veces: al Barça 2009-10 le faltará un hombre gol, y tambien un recambio con presencia fisica pero de tecnica apurada, ¡y también algunos entrenamientos en que se practiquen los disparos a distancia! Ojo- Essien: un monstruo... el mejor centrocampista 'todoterreno' del mundo, sea para segundo pivote, interior llegador o incluso de carrilero. ¿Qué opináis?